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Résumé
Le “checklist ba11ot1 est un bulletin de vote que l’on peut utiliser lors de
référendums. Il a été utilisé à Jackson, au Mississippi, en 1990 pour un référendum sur
des dépenses scolaires, et a également été utilisé quelques dix années plus tard, en mai
2002, en Colombie-Britannique pour un référendum portant sur un projet de négociations
avec les Amérindiens.
Le principe de ce bulletin de vote est de présenter un projet de référendum à la
population sous la forme de parties séparées. Si dans un référendum classique, la
population ne peut se prononcer que par un oui ou un non sur un projet de référendum
global, avec le “checklist ballot”, le contenu référendaire est segmenté, et l’électeur a la
possibilité de donner son avis sur chaque proposition individuellement. De plus, chaque
partie est décidée individuellement, ce qui veut dire qu’il n’y a pas qu’un gagnant:
plusieurs propositions peuvent être acceptées ou refusées lors du même vote. Nous
croyons que ceci permet à l’électrice de ne pas avoir à accepter ou refuser un projet
référendaire simplement sur la base de certains éléments qu’elle apprécie ou qu’elle
n’aime pas.
Dans ce mémoire, nous répondons à deux questions concernant le “checklist
ballot”. Premièrement, comment construire le bulletin de vote, et donc, comment en
arriver à la question référendaire? Après avoir passé en revue les deux méthodes utilisées
dans les référendums de Jackson et de la Colombie-Britannique, nous proposons notre
propre méthode, inspirée des principes de démocratie délibérative. Nous démontrons que
cette méthode permet de donner plus de participation aux citoyens, et aussi de réduire les
possibilités pour le gouvernement de manipuler la question référendaire pour s’assurer un
résultat qui lui convient.
Deuxièmement, quel seuil de majorité devrait-on exiger pour que les différents
items soit considérés comme ayant été acceptés par la population? De plus, à partir de
quel dénominateur devrions-nous calculer ce seuil? Après avoir comparé les avantages et
les désavantages de la majorité absolue et de la majorité qualifiée, nous démontrons que
la majorité qualifiée est la plus appropriée dans le cas du “checklist ballot”; toutefois, il
nous apparaît que cette majorité qualifiée devrait être ajustable, dépendamment de l’enjeu
soumis à la population. Concernant le dénominateur, nous cherchons à savoir si la
majorité devrait être calculée à partir des électeurs inscrits, des votes valides ou des votes
émis. Nous proposons de calculer la majorité à partir des votes émis.
Mots clés: “checklist ballot”, référendums, démocratie directe, démocratie
délibérative, seuils de majorité, éducation politique, assemblée délibérante
Nous n’avons pas trouvé d’équivalent en français
VAbstract
The checklist ballot is a type of ballot that can be used in referenda. It was used in
Jackson, Mississippi, in 1990 for a referendum on school bonds spending. It was also
used some ten years later, in May 2002, this time in British Columbia (3.C.), for a
referendum conceming treaty negotiations with Native people.
The ballot’s principle is to take a global referendum project, and divide it into
separate items, that are presented to the electorate. The ballot offers the possibility for the
electorate to vote on each item separately, and each item is decided upon independentÏy
of the others; there is thus the possibility to have many wimiers or losers on the same
ballot. It is our contention that this allows electors the liberty not to have to approve or
reject a global referendum project on the basis of certain elements that she likes or
dislikes strongly.
In this paper, we address two questions conceming the checklist ballot. first, how
should we construct the checklist ballot? Afler having reviewed the ballot construction
methods of the Jackson and the B.C. referenda, we propose our own ballot construction
method. Ibis method, inspired by elernents taken from deliberative democracy settings,
is, we believe, the best method to achieve two goals: first, it provides more opportunity
for actuat citizen participation in political processes that affect their lives; second, it
reduces the ability of governments to manipulate the referendum question to best suit
their interests.
Second, what majority threshold should be set for the items to be considered
accepted by the population? Furthermore, from what denominator should this threshold
be calculated? After comparing the advantages and disadvantages of absolute and
qualified majority thresholds, we show that a qualified majority is best in the case of the
checklist ballot; however, we believe this qualified majority should be adjustable,
depending on the decision to be taken be the population. Regarding the denominator, we
examine calculations based upon the registered electorate, based on valid votes, or based
on votes cast. We conclude that calculating the mai ority with respect to votes cast is the
best option.
Key words: checklist bal1ot, referendums, direct democracy, deliberative
democracy, majority thresholds, political education, deliberant assembly
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Introduction
In 1990, Jackson, Mississippi, in a referendum on school bonds,
experimented with a particular type of ballot: a checklist ballot. A littie more than
a decade later, in May 2002, the sarne ballot was used in British Columbia (B.C.)
for a referendum concerning treaty negotiations with Native people. h addition to
governments, professional organizations have also used this type of ballot. It bas
been used by the Masonry Society’, by the Eastem Federation of Mineralogical
and Lapidary Societies (EFMLS)2, and by some speed dating agencies.
Unfortunately, few studies have attempted to evaluate the ballot’s effects on voting
intentions and political outcomes. Actually, we have found only one, in which
James Glaser examines the impact of the ballot in the racially-charged atmosphere
of Jackson (Mississippi). He finds that the checklist ballot had a strong impact on
the result by diminishing the racial cues of electors3. This thesis explores in an
extensive mairner the ballot’s potential effect on referenda outcomes. The reader is
asked to keep in mmd that the present thesis is an exploratory work. It puts
forward ideas on why and how the checklist ballot should be used, how it should
be constructed, and what parameters should be set to determine its outcomes.
In a letter to its members, we can read: “The Architectural Practices Comrnittee considered
comments received on a Drawings Checklist ballot. Citation taken from document resuming the
annual spring reunion (14-16 may 2002, Calgary, Alberta). See masonrysociety.org
2 In the EfMLS’s newslefter ofFebmary 2001 (vo.39, no.2) we can read: “In the succeeding
months, your Executive Board members submitted to me their ideas and suggestions ofthose items
they feit to be the most worthy applications for funding. Many responded with like or similar
thoughts in the matter, and there was a wonderful variety of ideas submitted. These were then
compiled into a checklist ballot ofsome thirteen separate items.” See
http://www.amfed.org/efinls/index.htm
lames M. Glaser “White Voters, 3lack Schools: Structuring Racial Choices with a Checklist
Ballot”, A,nerican Journal ofPoÏitical Science 46 (2002), 35-46.
2What is a checklist ballot4? A referendum is usually a global project that
the govemment presents to the population, and demands of this population to
accept or refuse the project as a whoÏe. This logic changes when using the
checklist ballot. With the checklist ballot, the project is divided into different
parts, or items, and the elector has the liberty to vote on each of these items
separately. In addition, she bas the possibility to cast as many votes as there are
options on the ballot. A threshold is set, and all items that attain the threshold are
said to have been passed or accepted by the electorate, while the rest of the items
are rejected.
To illustrate, let us use the referendum in Jackson as an example. In this
case, instead ofvoting fora global spending project of $105,9 M, the project was
divided into different sectors of spending, and the voters were invited to vote on
ten different spending items. This allowed the electorate to vote separately, for
example, on spending for Tnew computer equipment’ or ‘improving school
security’5. Thus, this allows for more flexibility in the choices presented to the
electors, and makes it possible for certain parts of a global project to pass, even if
the project taken in its entirety would flot.
‘ See Appendix 1 for an example ofthe ballot used in the B.C. referendum.
Ibid., 37
3The checklist ballot can be compared to approval voting6. Both allow for
multiple voting, and both are systems of approval/rejection of particular items.
However, the main difference is that the ciecklist does not require there be only
one winner. In this sense, we believe that the checklist ballot considerably
diminishes the incentives for strategic voting7. In addition, approval voting lias
been presented as a candidate-election type ballot, while the checklist ballot is best
used in referenda. The basic argument presented in this thesis is that the checklist
ballot is the best ballot for electors to properly express their preferences, and thus,
for referendum outcomes to really reflect voter& opinions. It is our contention that
democracy needs to be revitalized, and that electors must be given better tools to
express their views on social and political objectives ofthe polity.
This thesis centers around two fundamental assumptions, or conditions,
that form the analytical framework that will drive our discussion. First, throughout
this thesis we will try to find ways to increase the actual participation of citizens in
political processes that affect their lives. Our framework is built around the
contention that an increase in political participation brings about an increase in
political skills and interest: participation breeds education. The thesis will also
revolve around a second assumption: we want political choices to be presented to
the electorate in the truest and fairest way, making it possible to express their
6 See Steven J. Brams and Peter C. f ishburn, ‘Approval Voting’, Ainerican Political Science
Review 72 (1978), $31-847; Approva! Voting (Boston: Birkauser/Springer-Verlag, 1983)
In contrast, approval voting, with the rigidity of having only one wiimer, is prone to bullet voting(or plunking). See Samuel Meniil III and Jack Nagel, “The Effect ofApproval Balloting on
Strategic Voting under Alternative Decision Rules’, Ainerican PoliticaÏ Science Review 81(1987),
510
4preferences in the best possible manner. Thus, another objective of this thesis will
be to promote ways in which these choices can be presented in a manner that will
allow for Ïess political manipulation on the part ofgovemment to secure outcomes
that best suit its interests. We believe that the checklist ballot is the best balloting
method to achieve these two goals8.
The thesis is divided into fours parts. In the first section, we discuss the
pros and cons of direct democracy. As the checklist ballot is best used in direct
dernocracy, it is imperative that we position ourselves in the debate between
proponents and opponents of direct democracy. We defend the idea that direct
democracy is not inherently prone to tyranny of the majority, and that voters are
competent enough to vote in a manner that is consistent with their interests and
values. We also argue that direct democracy makes for govemments to be more
responsive, and that it has a political education function.
In the second section, after having reviewed the ballot construction
methods in the Jackson and British Columbia referenda, we propose our own
ballot construction method, which incorporates elements of deliberative poils,
citizen juries and consensus conferences, to form something that resembles a low
key version of ‘demarchy’9. Ballot construction corresponds to deciding which
items go on the ballot, where and how. This is essentially deciding on the
8 A distinction between balloting inethod and decision procedure is introduced in Samuel Merrili
III and Jack Nagel, Ibid., 512
See John Burnhcim, Is Democracy Possible? The Alternative to Electorat Politics (London:
Politypress, 1985)
5referendum question. After having shown that the referendum question is a crucial
element in determining outcomes, we show that our proposed ballot construction
method best achieves the txvo goals set in our analytical framework: an increase in
actual citizen participation, and less possibility for govenm1ent to manipulate the
presentation ofthe referendum issue.
In the third section, the discussion deals with what thresholds should be set
for a given item to ‘pass’. We will review the pros and cons of majority principles
for the checklist ballot, i.e. if the checklist ballot should require items to be
approved by an absolute majority of the electorate, or if a more constraining
qualified majority threshold should be used. In parallel, we will also discuss the
different modalities (denominators) from which to calculate majorities, i.e. should
we calculate majorities based on votes cast, valid votes or with respect to the
totality ofthe registered electorate. We argue that a qualified majority is best, but
that this qualified majority should be adjustable, depending on the decision to be
taken. furthermore, we show that this majority should be calculated based on
votes cast.
A final section recaps our discussion and presents, in a more specific
manner, the advantages and disadvantages of the checklist ballot as proposed in
this thesis.
Chapter 1
Direct democracy: the good, the bad, or the ugly?
The debate between proponents of direct democracy and those favouring
the representative system lias been one of the most sensitive issues in the field of
political science. Taking heed from Mi1110, Tocquevill&’ and the debates between
Madison and Hamilton in the federalist Papers2, modem day scholars have yet
to pull together both conceptions, and arrive at a clear consensus over the question
of direct democracys usefuiness and efficiency in modem day democracy. Having
positioned ourselves in this debate, we will be in a better position to focus our
discussion on elements pertaining to the checklist ballot itself.
We begin by postulating that not ail direct democracy is of the same type.
Julian Eule, in an article discussing what role the courts should have in reviewing
the constitutionality of direct dernocracy outcomes, distinguishes two instances
(types) of direct democracy’3. The first type is what lie calis “substitutive”; it is the
purest form of direct democracy, allowing the electorate to bypass completely the
representative agents. The electorate does not need the pemission of the
legislature to place an issue on the ballot (the only limitation is gamering enough
support, in the form of signatures), and the issue becomes law if a majority of
electors approve. This forrn is currently called a popular initiative. A second type
‘° See John Stuart Miii [1859; 1$61; 1869], Three Essays: on Liberty, Representative Government
and the Subjection of Women (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960)
See Alexis de Tocqueviile [1835; 1840], De la démocratie en Amérique (Paris: Union générale
d’édition, 1963)
2 See Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, 111e Fede,-alist Papers (New York: The
new American library, 1961)
Julian Eule, “Judiciai Review of Direct Democracy”, Yale Law Journal 99 (1990), 1503-1589
7is the “complementary” form. Here, the legislature and the electorate work in
concert; the legislature refers laws or projects to the electorate who then signify its
approval or disapproval. This form is currently called a referendum. The
difference between the two types lies in the possible outcomes. “The substitutive
plebiscite enables popular majorities to pass legislation that minorities have
managed to prevent in the legislature”4; “complementary plebiscites enable
popular majorities to prevent legislation that minorities have managed to convince
legislative majorities to enact”15.
We should also clarify right away that in this discussion, we are mainly
concemed with referenda. Though we wilÏ use data and studies that cover both
referenda and initiatives, we must concede, as we stated earlier, that we advocate
the use of the checklist ballot in referenda. This preference is due to two factors.
On the one hand, the legal evidence: rare are the countries that allow for popular
initiatives, or even if they allow it, use it very frequently. The use of initiatives is
mainly restricted to the U.S., Switzerland, Austria, and in a modified version to
Italy, which allows for abrogation referenda (also called rejective initiatives). On
the other hand, there is the question of adaptability. The checklist ballot, as we
present it here, is an instrument of direct democracy that must be used and
implernented in concord with the legislature. As we wilI discuss later, we propose
a method for ballot construction and framing of the questions that leaves ample
space for citizen participation and civic innovation. In addition, Austin Ranney
“ Ibid., 1574
‘ Ibid., 1575
8reminds us that “les craintes d’une tyrannie de la majorité qui sont parfois
exprimées à propos des décisions référendaires ne sont valables que pour les votes
sur des initiatives populaires”16. Finally, the use of referenda is better adapted to
British-type parliamentary institutions, like those of Canada and Quebec’7.
The arguments for and against the use of direct democracy-type devices
can be resumed thus: for opponents, the dangers of direct democracy lie in its
potential to be used by the majority to tyraimize minorities, and the lack of
competence of the electorate in deciding over complex issues. On the other side,
for the supporters of direct democracy, the benefits lie in the need for greater
participation of the public in deciding issues that are of importance to it, i.e. the
need for democracy to be more decentralized, and the educational value that more
participation is thought to add to the publics knowledge and implication in the
political process. Let us review these arguments in greater detail.
Arguments against
Tyranny oJthe lnajority. In a strong attack against the use of direct
democracy-type devices, Barbara Gamble asks: “when citizens have the power to
legislate issues directly, wilÏ the majority tyrannize the minority?”8. Her answer is
clear: “By examining over three decades of civil rights laws that have appeared on
16 Austin Ranney, ‘Référendum et démocratie”, Pouvoir 74 (1996), 17
I? On this point, see Mafthew Mendelsohn, “Introducing Deliberative Direct Democracy in
Canada: Leaming from the American Experience”, America,i Review of Canadian Studies 26
(1996), 449-468. However, a dissenting voice is that of I. Ross Harper. See Referendums are
Dangerous (London: Conservative political center, 1997), 17-31
18 Barbara S. Gamble, “Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote”, American Jottrnal ofPoliticaÏ
Science 41(1997), 245
9state and local ballots across the nation, I find strong evidence that the majority
lias indeed used its direct legislative powers to deprive political minorities of their
civil rights”9. Her attacks are emblematic of this argument: majorities will use
direct democracy to deprive minorities of their rights, rights that are usually
defended by the eÏected representatives. Gamble, however, points out two flaws in
her analysis: 1) she did not include all initiatives put to popular vote; 2) she may
have included only the most controversial. Extending her study, Bowier and
Donovan dispute lier findings. Even if minorities may 5e Ïess protected by direct
democracy than in strictly representative systems, “this evidence should not be
used to imply that direct democracy per se is abusive to minorities”20. What counts
the most in evaluating the possible fallacies and dangers of direct dernocracy is the
size ofthe voting communities21. Their analysis illustrates that minorities are less
19 Ibid, 246
20 Todd Donovan and Shaun Bowier, ‘Direct Democracy and Minority Rights: an Extension”,
American Journal ofPolitical Science 42 (1998), 1023. They had already made this argument in
“Responsive or Responsible Govemment?” in Shaun bowier, Todd Donovan and Caroline J.
Tolbert, Citizens as Legislators: Direct Democracy in the United States (Columbus: Ohio State
University Press, 1998), 249-273. In another extension ofGamble’s study, similar resuits were also
obsen’ed by Bruno S. Frey and Genz Goette. See “Does the Popular Vote Destroy Civil Rights”,
American Journal ofPolitical Science 42 (1998), 1343-48.
21 The relation between size and democracy is one that is largely discussed in the literature. For
example, Dahi and Tufte, examining the link between size of democracy and citizen effectiveness
and system capacity find that “no single type or size of unit is optimal for achieving {these] twin
goals.” See Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size andDemocracy (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1973) 138. Furthermore, as Keating shows, the issue is quite complex, since it
may flot only be size that matters, but also distance between people, density and distribution of
population. See, M. Keating, “Size, Efficiency and Democracy: Consolidation, Fragmentation and
Public Choice” in D. Judge, G. Stoker & H. Wolman (eds), Theories of Urban Politics (London:
Sage, 1995), 117-134. Similarly, Fiskin distinguishes two versions of direct democracy, based on
size ofthe polity. On the one hand, we have what he calls a small-scale version. This would be
equivalent to small communities taking decisions in a collective manner. “It might be argued that
the small-scale version achieves deliberation, at least on occasion, but at the cost of vulnerability to
tyraimy’. A second type is the large-scale version, where there is a larger grouping and probably a
bigger physical territory. This version “carnes with it a great lessening ofdeliberation”. See James
S. F iskin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Dentocratic Reform (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1991), 52
10
protected by direct democracy in smaller communities — places that [they] assume
have a greater hornogeneity of interest”22.
Similarly, Zoltan Hajnal et al., in a study on the impact of direct
democracy on minorities in Califomia, find that cntics have overstated their case
against direct democracy. While pointing out that Latinos tend to be on the losing
side more often than other types of minorities, “when [they] consider outcomes
across ail propositions, [they] find that the majority of Latino, Asian Americans,
and African American voters were on the wiiming side of the vote”23. Finally,
Thomas Cronin, in his seminal piece on direct democracy-type device usage in the
U.S., finds that “the overail record shows that American voters have in most cases
approved measures protecting or promoting minority nghts”24. li parallel,
Mendelsohn points that “there is no systematic evidence that direct democracy
produces intolerant results”25. Thus, it seems safe to conclude that although certain
discriminating measures may have been passed by direct democracy, there is no
evidence that direct democracy systematically threatens minority rights.
CompÏexity and voter competence. Alrnost forty years ago, Converse
dismissed the competence of the electorate, showing that most people did not have
opinions, even on issues that had been subject to grand controversy, and that
22 Donovan and Bowier, ‘Direct Democracy and Minority Rights”, 1023
23 Zoltan L. Hajnal, Elisabeth R. Gerber and Hugh Louch., “Minorities and Direct Legislation:
Evidence from Califomia Ballot Proposition Elections”, Journal ofPolitics 64 (2002), 154
24 Thomas Cronin, Direct Democracy: The Potitics ofInitiatives, Referendum, and Recaïl,
(Cambridge: Harvard university press, 1989), 98.
2 Mendelsohn, “ Introducing Deliberative direct Democracy in Canada”, 458
11
consistency among beliefs in the public was restncted to a minority of
sophisticated voters26. According to this une of thought, voters do flot have the
knowledge or the know-how to deal with complex issues of policy making; thus,
these issues are best lefi to elected representatives, whose job it is to resolve them.
Furthermore, as is shown by Delli Carpini and Keeter the electorate is no more
competent now than before27. In addition, as Luskin points out,
If education had the effect it is supposed to have, the revolutionary spread of education
since the 1950s should have brought a similarly dramatic increase in sophistication. {...] these
resuits suggest that a highly sophisticated, participatory public is flot even feasible prescription28.
Similarly, referenda tend to divide the population into two camps (unless
there are more than two possible alternatives), and renders an unwarranted
simplicity (dichotomy) to complex issues29. for Higley and McAllister
By forcing relatively uninformed voters to give simple answers to complex constitutional
or policy questions, referendums invite elites to make daims that are often more simplistic and
deliberately misleading than those they employ in elections30.
Magleby notes that voters who do flot have sufficient information on the
issues tend to vote in irrational and random ways, where their vote does not fit
their preferences (if indeed they would have any). Thus, the choice of low
inforrned voters’ (which form the majority in many studies, Magleby’s included) is
far more subject to be inftuenced by racial or other factors only indirectly linked to
26 Philip E. Converse, “The Nature ofBeliefs Systems in Mass Publics”, in David Apter (ed),
Ideology and Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964), 206-261
27 Michael X. Delli Carprni and Scott Keeter, What Americans Know About Politics and Why it
Mauers (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1996)
28 Robert C. Luskin, “Explaining Political Sophistication”, Political Behaviour 12 (1990), 352-53
29 Vincent Lemieux, “le référendum et la démocratie au Canada’, in Peter Aucoin (ed), Le
Gouvernement représentatf et la reforme des institutions (Ottawa : Commission royale sur l’union
économique et les perspectives de développement du Canada, 1985), 117-172
° John Higley and Jan McAllister, “Elite Division and Voter Confusion: Australia’s Republic
Referendum in 1999”, Ettropean Journal ofPolitical Research 41(2002), 845
12
the question submitted to popular consultation31. This foiiows Lawrence LeDuc’s
point that “voters cannot generally be expected to have weIl-formed opinions on
an issue that has flot previously been the subject of any broad public debate32.
Papadopoulos, another nay-sayer of voter competence, starting from the principle
‘that govemance requires empathy and self-limitation’, finds that elites are much
better off at managing complexity. “It seems indeed difficuit to avoid a certain
dose of elitism if the major goal is to guarantee the viability ofthose compromises
indispensable for the management of comp1exity33.
However, not ail authors share these concems about the question of
complexity and voter competence, and the debate is far from being settled. While
many recognize that some people do not have the interest or information to cast
votes on complicated issues, they argue that ordinary citizens, if competent
enough to choose the best representative to defend their interest, are equally
competent in deciding the best option(s) in a referendum34. In a bold statement,
Bowier and Donovan, examining Califomi&s experience with direct democracy,
state that
Research shows that questions about voter competence are largely settled, and settled in
favour of the voters provided that, mechanisms are in place which allow them to see who is behind
David Magleby, Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1984)
32 Lawrence LeDuc, “Opinion Change and Voting Behaviour in Referendums”, Ezcropean Journal
ofPotiticat Research 41(2002), 717
Yaimis Papadopoulos, “Analysis ofFunctions and Dysfunctions of Direct Democracy: Top
Down and Bottom-Up Perspectives”, Politics & Society 23 (1995), 432-433
N See Thomas Cronin, “Public Opinion ami Direct Democracy”, PS: Political Science and Politics
21(1988) 612-619. In addition, Susan Scarrow notes that the use of direct democracy at a local
level reduces the argument ofcompetence, since communities are smaller and questions are
generally more mundane. See “Direct Democracy and Institutional Change: a Comparative
Investigation”, Conparative Political Studies 34 (2001), 651-65
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a proposai. The ballot leaflet and financial disclosure iaws [...] allow them to vote in the light of
their own interests and ideology. Voters may thus cast their ballot as if they were ftilly infonned.35
One pervasive issue that springs up when discussing voter competence in
direct democracy is the roÏe that particular eues may play36. Cues are information
shortcuts that can be used by lesser informed electors to emulate the vote ofbetter
informed electors, thus nuÏiifying the effect of education and information
gathering capacities that we expect better educated citizens possess. Lau and
Rediaswk talk of five commonly used heuristics37: 1) party affiliation; 2)
candidate’s ideology; 3) endorsement by someone trusted; 4) poil resuits; 5)
candidate appearance. The argument generally made by scholars that sec eues as a
possible remedy to low political information and interest is best presented by
Arthur Lupia: cues ailow voters to make more accurate inferences about the
electoral alternatives, which increases the likelihood that they cast the same vote
as they would have cast if they had acquired more accurate information”38. Thus,
eues may allow lower informed electors to make a reasonable choice even if they
do not posses ail the information or political skills that better informed voters
have. However, as he points out, only in certain conditions are eues sufficient to
overcome the lack of knowledge of some parts of the electorate. for example, eues
can only be effective if the endorser is deemed credible by the electors; in the
See Shaun Bowier and Todd Donovan, “Califomia’s Experience with Direct Democracy”,
Parliamentaiy Affairs 53 (2000), 650
Some scholars use the term “cognitive heuristic”, like Richard Lau and David P. Redlawsk. See
“Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Politicai Decision Maldng” American
Journal ofPofltical Science 45 (2002), 951-971. Others, like Larry Barteis, prefer the term
information shortcuts. See “Uninformed Voters: Information Effects in Presidential Elections”,
American Journal ofPolitical Science 40 (1996), 194-230
Lau and Redlaswk, “Advantages and Disadvantages. . .“, 953-954
Arthur Lupia, “Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information”, American
Political Science Review 86 (1992), 391
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absence of credibility, eues are onÏy good if the voter’s perception of the endorser’s
preferences is correct39.
Others, like Sniderman et al. see the role of eues as a positive way for low
informed electors to make a reasonable choice, albeit for different reasons40. They
note that well-informed and low-informed voters do flot use the same methods in
making their electoral choice; the essential difference between both is on what
aspect of the past they focus on. While the well-informed tend to make their
electoral choice by comparing candidates, or prospective voting, the lesser
informed tend to make their choice by doing a performance evaluation of the
incumbent, or retrospective voting. Thus, the better informed tend to look at the
bigger picture, while poorly informed voters make their choice with a narrow
calculus at hand, basically focussing on a few points of direct interest to them. In
this sense, if lower informed voters can use eues to circumscribe, to transform
their ballot choice as a referendum for or against the incumbent, they can be
expected to make as reasonable a choice as would better informed voters. Thus,
While the poorly informed voter, to be sure, Yacks the information to make the kind of
choice the well-informed voter can [...] the less welY informed voter may have the information he
needs provided he treats the choice before him as a choice for or against the incumbent. [...j In
these alternatives ways, the choices of voters can be approximately rational because of, not merely
despite, their shortfalls in information41.
See Arthur Lupia, ‘Shortcuts Versus Encyclopaedias: Information and Voting Behaviour in
Califomia Insurance Reform Elections’, Ainerican Political Science Review 8$ (1994), 63-76
40 See Paul M. Sniderman, James M. Glaser and Robert Griffin, ‘Information and Electoral
Choice” in Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody and Philip E. Tetlock (eds), Reasoning and
Choice: Explorations in Political PsychoÏog’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),
Y 64-178
‘ Ibid., 178
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However, there are dissenting voices, as other scholars are flot convinced
by these arguments about cues. The argument generally made to discredit the
positive function of cues is discussed by Lau and Redlaswk. Afler carrying out an
experimental analysis, they find that “political sophistication absent heuristic use
contributes littie to better decision making”42. From this perspective, even if cues
eau be thought of as a helpful tool for lower informed voters, these voters do flot
have the skills to properly use them, in ways that can help them reduce their
educationlinformational disadvantages. Thus
[Whule] the decisions of more sophisticated voters are often helped by employing
cognitive heuristics, [the] less sophisticated voters may actually end up making lower quality
decisions if they employ the same heuristics. [...] In fact, heavy reliance on political heuristics
actually made decision making less accurate arnong those low in political sophistication43.
As Robert Luskin points out “sophistication [...] is much ]ess a function of
the information to which people are exposed than to what they can and are
motivated to make of it”44. Sophistication is a matter of how much, and in what
ways a person thinks of politics, not what he thinks about it. It depends above ail
on motivation (interest and occupation), but aiso on abilities (intelligence)45. The
rationale here puts the onus mainly on abilities to process information: since we
expect less informed voters to have lower abilities to process information, this
decreases the impact (gains) that exposure to certain types of information may
provide these electors in helping them vote as if they had as much information as
well-informed voters.
42 Lau and Redlaswk, “Advantages and Disadvantages. . .“, 964
Ibïd., 964;966
‘ See Robert C. Luskin, “Explaining Political Sophistication’, 35 1-352.
See Robert C. Luskin, “Measuring political Sophistication’, American Journal ofPolitical
Science 31(1987), 856-99
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Finally, other sceptics, like Kuklinsky and Quirk, find that the logic of
human behaviour and cognitive capacities diminishes the potential positive effects
of cues46. Cognitive abilities are Thard-wired’ in our neural circuitry (mental
processes are only partly shaped by personal experiences); cognitive processes
generate systernatically false beliefs in order to promote certain kinds of
behaviour; and on many occasions, people make judgment in unreliable ways
without noticing it. following this, the authors find three implications for the
political process: 1) even if some cognitive processes work in some conditions,
they do not work in others; 2) there is systematic bias in heuristic judgement; 3)
politics is too complicated for heuristics to help in a substantial way. They thus
reject the notion that usage of cues may bridge the gap that education, information
and interest creates between weÏl-informed and poorly informed electors.
For our part, on the question of cues, we follow Christin et aI.’s contention
that for some ballot measures, effects of endorsement and party cues help, but for
others, they don’t47. We tend to agree with Lau and Redlaswk that less informed
electors do not have the capacities to adequately process information shortcuts in
ways that can help them make a choice that would be as competent as the choice
that better educated voters would make. However, we acknowledge that if some
46 lames H. Kuklinsky and Paul I. Quirk, “Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cognition,
Heuristics, and Mass Opinion” in Arthur Lupia, Matthew D. McCubbins and Sarnuel L. Popkin
(eds), Elements ofReason: Cognition, Oioice, and the Bottnds ofRationallty (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 153-182
‘ Thomas Christin, Simon Hug and Pascal Sciarini, “Interests and Information in Referendum
Voting: an Analysis ofSwiss Voters”, European Journal ofPolitical Research 41(2002), 773
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electors feel that eues help them, so be it. We cannot stop them afler ail! We
simply wish to express our reservations about the possible advantages of using
information shortcuts as a way to truly compensate for poor politicai knowledge
and interest.
On the question of voter competence as a whole, we do not feel that the
question is settled as easily as Donovan and Butier try to make it, neither is it as
gioomy as Converse or Luskin paint it. As Mondak shows, certain methodoÏogy
used in measuring political knowledge may not adequateiy paint a true portrait of
the citizen48. for example, Davis and Silver show that the race of the interviewer
lias significant effects on political knowledge surveys. They find that African
American respondents get fewer answers right when interviewed by a white
interviewer than when it is a black interviewer. furthermore, their analysis shows
that these observed differences cannot be expiained by differences in educational
background or gender of respondent49. We see no reason why voters would be
more competent to detennine which candidate would best defend their interest
than to judge whether a given proposai would benefit or hurt them. We thus agree
with Jan Budge: “Voters seem reasonably competent to make judgements on
poïicy and certainly as competent as they are to make judgements on
48 Jeffery J. Mondak, “Developing Valid Knowledge Scales”, American Journal ofPolitical
Science 45 (2001), 224-238
Darren W. Davis and Brian D. Silver, “Stereotype Threat and Race of Interviewer Effects in a
Survey on Political Knowledge”, A,nerican Journal ofPoliticaÏ Science 47 (2003), 33-45
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candidates”50. This argument is similar, in part, to Key’s interpretation of voter
competence:
Voters are not fools. [...] many individual voters act in odU ways; yet, in the large the
electorate behaves about as rationally and responsibly as we should expect, given the clarity of the
alternatives presented to it and the character ofthe information available to it5t.
Thus we conclude that some fair criticism has been made about voter
competence, but we find no strong demonstration that would make us doubt that
electors wouid be Iess competent to vote on proposais than they would to vote on
candidates.
Arguments in favour
Responsiveness of government. One of the most important arguments in
favour of using direct democracy is that it increases the responsiveness of
governments, and decentralizes decision-making in the hands of the voters; they
are the ones who will bear the brunt of legisiations. “The daim of the people to
rule does flot rest on their knowiedge of the truth; rather since they are subjects of
the iaw, and the law binds them, they must also be its makers”52. In this light, then,
direct democracy, whiie flot supplanting the representatwe system, can be used in
complementary and ad hoc ways to increase citizen participation, and make
goveniments more accountable. Nevil Johnson expresses clearly the rationale for
this une of thought. first, “important constitutional changes shouid not be made
50 lan Budge, The New Challenge ofDirect Democracv (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 132
V.O. Key Jr., The Responsible Electorate: Rationalitv in Presidential Voting 1936-1960
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966), 7. Though lie makes this statement
in thinking about presidential elections, we extend it to direct democracy electors, since tlie voters
are the sanie.
52 Williarn Nelson, “The Institutions ofDeliberative Democracy”, Social Philosophy & Policy 17
(2000), 184.
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over the heads of the people”53. Second, there needs to be more effective popular
control of the public authorities, on the ground that 1) people have a right to be
consulted, and 2) legislatures sometimes vote on issues that have no popular
support “and in respect to which they may be flouting public opinion”54. Finally,
“governrnents cannot base their authority on majority in Parliament, since a
majority in Parliament does not necessarily mean that they represent a majority in
the population”55. Butier and Ranney express similar views. For them, referenda
allow for the citizen’s will to be expressed properly, for public decisions to be
arrived at publicly, and to diminish (if flot end) apathy and alienation created by
the domination of spccial interest groups on governrnent56.
A parallel argument is made that referenda allow voters to focus more
precisely on particular points of decision-making, a focus that is not achievable in
regular elections. For example, Lemieux finds that a referendum lias an advantage
over normal elections because it enables citizens to pronounce themselves on
precise problems which caimot be deait with in the course of elections, where a
whole range of issues are at stake, leaving only a thin space for debate over
individual issues57. Similarly, J. Patrick Boyer notes that “in a referendum, only
Nevil Johnson, “Types of Referendum” in Austin Ranney (cd), The Referendum Device
(Washington: American Entreprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 19$ 1), 23
Id. Bowier, Donovan and Tolbert note: “legislative settings can sometimes produce policies
different from those that mass preferences might otherwise demand. [...] there are reasons to
expect that public policies will more closely match citizen preferences in direct democracy states’.
See Bowier, Donovan and Tolbert, Citizens as Legislators, 14
Ibid., 23-24
56 Sec David E. Butier and Austin Ranney (eds), Referendums A comparative $tudy ofPractice
and Theoiy (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978)
Vincent Lemieux, “Le référendum et la démocratie”
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one issue is at stake, and the citizen can express lis opinion on that issue aloneH5$.
Altematively, A.M. Adams finds that
The particular advantage of the referendum is that it permits the severance of specific
issues from political parties and enables the electorate to reject them even though they may have
been enacted by the political party which enjoys the support ofa majority ofthe electorate59.
It can be thus concluded that
[O]n balance, [direct democracy] has provided for slightly more opportunities for
accountability; and in those states and localities that provide for them, initiatives, referendum, and
recail have provided a safety valve for citizens who are upset by controversial policy decisions or
unseemly performance by public officiais60.
These arguments, however, face critics from some authors. For Roussillon,
usage of direct democracy is no sign of a more modem and/or more civilised
polity. For him, the lack of deliberation surrounding referenda (legislative
referenda) makes the process mostly undemocratic.
Le processus décisionnel démocratique s’inscrit donc dans une conception d’un temps
politique forcément long, alors que le référendum, comme les sondages d’opinions, relève, d’une
certaine manière, de l’instantané, sinon de l’éphémère61.
Similarly, for Mendelsohn, two points bring fallacy to the argument of
greater accountability and decentralizing democracy62. First, the cleavage between
people who vote and people who don’t vote in regular elections is heightened in
direct democracy. This means that as in regular elections, the better-off, more
educated, older, married... tend to vote; in this sense, the potential increase in
See J. Patrick Boyer, Lawmaking by the People: Referendums and Plebiscites in Canada(Toronto: Burterworths, 1982) 45
Audrey Marilyn Adams, , A Study of the Use ofPlebiscites and Referendums by the Province of
British-C’olumbia (unpublished M.A. thesis, department of economics and political science,
University ofBritish-Columbia, 1958) 4. Cited in J. Pafrick Boyer, Op. Cit., 46-4760 See Thomas Cronin, Direct De,nocracv, 223
61 Henri Roussillon, “Contre le référendum!”, Pouvoirs 77 (1996), 184
62 See Matthew Mendelsohn, “Introducing Deliberative Direct Democracy in Canada”
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participation by decentralizing decision-making seems to be overshadowed by the
fact that decentralization will only affect those who already vote. Thus, enlarging
participation without analogous changes may reinforce inequality. For example, if
decentralizing is made without changes in the advantage of special interests or
other groups to organize collectively, then equaÏity in inputs is not enhanced.
Thus,
Decentralizatïon which may appear to enhance one measure of democratization
— the
opportunity to share in decision-making
— does flot necessanly ensure the achievement of equality
in terms ofeither input or output. Indeed, it may create inequality and unfaimess63.
The second point made by Mendelsoim is that “the data indicate that no
growth in political efficacy accompanies the introduction or expansion of direct
dernocracy64.
A final argument stems ftom the idea that people do flot want more
participation: information gathering is hard and time-consuming, and there is the
everlasting problem of free riders, who will flot make that extra effort to
participate in the polity, while reaping the benefits of the vote outcome(s)65. This
argument bas been pushed strongly by Hibbins and Theiss-Mors&s ‘stealth
democracy’ thesis.
Peopie do not care at ail about most public policies and do flot want to be more involved
in the political process. [...] The people prefer a process that aliows them to keep politics at arm’s
length. [...] Their ideal system is one in which they themselves are flot involved, but where they
can be confident that decisions makers will be motivated by a desire to serve the people66.
63 See Geraint Parry and George Moyser, ‘More Participation, More Democracy?”, in David
Beetham (ed), Defining and Measuring Dernocracy (London: Sage, 1994), 5 6-5764 See Matthew Mendelsohn, “Introducing Deliberative Direct Democracy in Canada”, 45565 See Yannis Papadopoulos, “Analysis ofFunctions..
66 Johi-i R. Hibbins and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Steatth Democracy: Americans’ Beliefs About
how Government Should Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 227
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In their view, people do flot want to participate: they sec the political arena
with a certain disgust and mistrust. What they want is to know that if they do
decide to participate, their participation will have an impact on the polity. In
effect, the people want ‘stealth democracy’: where democratic procedures exist, but
flot visible on a routine basis. The people want to be able to make democracy
visible and accountable only on those rare occasions when they feel motivated to
be involved67.
These daims do flot necessanly dampen our enthusiasm in promoting
direct democracy. Other data, particularly cross-national data, do show that
citizens want greater involvement. While for Hibbins and Theiss-Morse, high
levels of citizen approval for more participation is chimerical, Russeil J. Dalton et
al., studying data from Germany and other Europeans democracies, state that the
available opinion polis suggest that most people in Western democracies favour
reforms that would move toward a more participatory style of democratic
govemment”68. Bowier et al. show that this support actualÏy reflects a desire to
place a check on the influence of special interests69: citizens sec the voting public,
participating via direct democracy, as a check on the power that narrow interest
generally have in politics. Furthermore, people believe the voting public is far less
corrupted by the power of special interest than are the legislatures. In addition, as
67
68 Russeli J. Dalton, Wilhelm Burklin and Andrew Dmmmond, “Public Opinion and Direct
Democracy”, Journal ofDemocracy 12 (2001), 145
69 Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan and Jeffrey Karp, “Popular Attitudes Towards Direct
Democracy”, Paper prcpared for the 2003 American political Science Association Meeting,
Philadeiphia, PA. Aug 28-3 1.
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Bowier and Donovan show, it is in states that have and use direct democracy-type
devices that citizens feel they have the more say, and are better able to take actions
that are effective in the political realm70.
Thus, while we should remain careful in our judgement of what
opportunities decentralizing decision-making will bring, we should flot forget that
“the case for direct democracy is strong precisely because citizen participation in
decision-making and the active consent of as many people as possible to public
policy are key democratic values”71, and that citizens want more participation in
these decision-making procedures. It is precisely for reasons of extending decision
making into more hands than only those of a small number of aristocrats that the
bourgeoisie embarked on it’s crusade for more “democratic” institutions and a
system of govemment that would be ‘by the people, for the people’. While we do
not (yet?) wish to propose a total removal of representative systems for strictly
direct decision making, we are confident that direct democracy does indeed make
for more responsiveness on the part of governnents.
Educationat and interest formation: Another pervasive argument in favour
of direct democracy is that by increasing citizen participation in public life, the
citizen will leam more about the system, its working and also its rationale.
furthermore, having the opportunity to have a greater say in decision-making will
arouse her interest in politics, which should lead to greater information gathering
70 Shaun Bowier and Todd Donovan, “Dernocracy, Institutions and Attitudes About Citizen
Influence on Government”, British Journal ofPolitical Science 32 (2002), 37 1-90
71 lan Budge, The New challenge ofDirect Democracy, 4
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on lier part and eventually make ber a more conscious and enliglitened citizen,
better able to deal witli complex political decision making that affects her life. As
Herbert McClosky notes ‘democratic beliefs and habits are obviously flot ‘naturaP
but must be learnedB72.
Close to two centuries ago, Rousseau and Miii were aiready making such a
daim. Rousseau, in lis Le contrat social, advocated a system in which ail had
submitted to a common contract, the social contract, of which an essential
component was the educative function that participation offered the citizen73.
Rousseau’s ideal system is designed to develop responsible, individual social and political
action through the effects ofthe participatory process. During this process [...] lie finds that lie has
to take into account wider matters than his own immediate private interest if he hopes to gain
cooperation from others. Once the participatory system is established, [...] it becomes self
sustainïng because the very qualities that are required of individual citizens if the system is to work
successfully are those that the process of participation itselfdevelops and fosters74.
John Stuart Miil foiiows pretty much the same logic in his analysis of the
educativc function of political participation. Foiiowing Tocqueville’s analysis of
19th century Arnerica, Miil notes that participation at the local ievel, where
questions are of direct interest to her, wili teach the citizen democratic principies:
We do flot leam to read or write, to ride or swim, by being merely told how to do it, but by
doing it, 80 it is only by practising popular govemment on a limited scale, that the people will ever
leam how to exercise it on a larger75.
72 Hebert McClosky, ‘Consensus and Ideology in American Poiitics”, American Political Science
Review 5$ (1964), 375
As is stated in Duquette and Lamoureux, ‘la citoyenneté rousseauiste est très intimement
associée à un projet pédagogique. Pour lui, on ne naît pas citoyen, on le devient.” See Michel
Duquette et Diane Larnoureux, Les idées politiques: de Platon à Marx (Montréal: Les presses de
l’Université de Montréal, 1996), 345
See Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theo,y (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1 970), 25
John Stuart Miii, “Essays on Poiitics and Culture”, quoted in Carole Patemen, Ibid., 31
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More contemporary scholars have gone the same way. For Carole
Pateman, “the evidence indicates that experience of a participatory authority
structure might [...] be effective in dirninishing tendencies toward non-democratic
attitudes in the individual”76. for her, increasing participation leads to greater
understanding of the link between the public and private spheres, where
assessments of situations, real or idealized, are better made and sense of
involvement fosters better knowledge of the place of an individual in society.
The existence of a participatory society would mean that [man] was beiler able to assess
the performance of representatives at the national level, better equipped to take decisions of
national scope when the opportunity arose to do so, and beller able to weigh up the impact of
decisions taken by national representatives on his own life and immediate surroundings77.
Similarly, for Benjamin Barber, “l’activité civique entraîne les individus à
penser en termes publics, en citoyens, et leur statut de citoyens les dote d’un sens
utile de la collectivité et de la justice”78. Thus, for these authors, participation
helps in forming citizens that are better aware of the impact of their actions on
others in the community. There is potential for a greater appraisal ofthe collective
‘US’, and a better understanding of the relation between individual and collective
preferences. Furthermore, participation educates the citizen in the working of
govemment and the impact of certain policies.
Some critics, however, do flot hold the same view, and question whether
political participation really has an educative function. For example, fishkin finds
that
76 Pateman, Ibid.., 105
n Ibid., 110
Benjamin R. Barber, Démocratie forte (Paris: Desclèe de Brouwer, 1997), 172
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The American experience with referendums and other variants of direct democracy does
flot support the view that by giving power to the people we also encourage educational efforts on
their behalfto acquire the information to deliberate about the use ofthat power79.
This point is also discussed by Patrice Collas. In his view, referenda do flot
create novelty outcomes, since the electors tend mainly to legitimize power shifts
that take place inside the polity. Giving the example ofthe transition to the French
fifih Republic, he notes that the 195$ September referendum legitimized changes
and party shifts that had occurred in may ofthat year, where De Gaulle was named
head of the executive council by power brokerage and alliance shifis. Thus, he
concludes that in referendum voting, “les électeurs se limitent souvent à entériner
un nouveau rapport de forces politiques issu ou provoqué par des évènements de
nature non-élecotral&’80. Furthermore, he notes that in the 1992 referendum on
french adhesion to Maastricht, the electoral cleavage is clearly a religious oiie,
where No voters mostly came from historically secular regions, while the Yes
voters came from the most religious areas of France. Thus, the failure to go
beyond traditional religious cleavages would be an indication that education is not
one ofthe referendum’s functions.
In a sirnilar fashion, the rejection of Maastricht by the Danes was also
seen, by some, as evidence that direct democracy did flot help educate its citizens
to go beyond self-interested voting. The failure by Danish voters to go beyond
their national interest, and to look forward to a larger Europe, especially in light of
the fact that the great majority of elites supported Maastricht, was seen as
James S. Fiskin, Deinocracy and Detiberarion, 52
80 Patrice Collas, “Consultations populaires et dernier référendum”, Revue politique et
parlementaire 94 (1992), 34
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evidence that education was not part of the process. Niels Christiansen remarked
that the rejection of Maastrich represented a reassertion by ordinary people of
their right to formulate, and work to satisfy, their own needs”81. Others remarked
that
The majority of the political parties had believed that the Danes were ready to accept this
step forward towards doser integration. [However], the voters stili remembered what they did flot
like
- as stated in 1972 and 1986 — and voted accordingly82.
One must however keep in mmd that the Danes have been historically
fearful of integration on the grounds that they did not want to lose political
sovereignty, and the original Maastricht treaty did leave many wondering what the
consequences of integration would be.
Others have presented a parallel argument, where it is not direct democracy
itself, but participation in the polity as such, that is rejected as a means to help
educate citizens in prime values of democracy, such as tolerance. for example,
Muller et al., conducting a cross-national study of Guatemala, Turkey and the
U.S., find that “the relationship between political participation and support for
democratic norms seems at best to be weak, and it is clearly system-specific”83.
Mark Mattem, conducting an experimental ‘democratic education’ course, in
which he decentralized most professorial duties (correcting, discipline...) to lis
students, also finds that increased participation does flot bring about expected
resuits. Though students learned how to work with people they did not necessarily
81 See Niels Finn Christiansen, “The Danish No to Maastricht”, New LeftReview 195 (1992), 10082 Karen Siune and Palle Svensson, “The Danes and the Maastricht Treaty: the Danish EC
Referendum ofJune 1992”, Electoral Studies 12 (1993), 110
83 Edward N. Muller, Mitcheli A. Seligson and liter Turan, “Education, Participation, and Support
for Democratic Norms”, Comparative Pofltics 19 (1987), 28
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got along with, students were alarmingly iÏl-informed about basic tenants of
democratic theory and practice. For example, nearly haif reported that political
equality in the United States was a reality, not merely a formality, and that
economic power did flot buy politica power. This leads Mm to conclude that
“basic questions of democratic theory that were amply addressed in this course
and the failure of some students to grasp or accept them is troubling”84.
Finally, another une of argument stems from the idea that people do flot
wish for large participation in politics. Thus, increasing participation may in fact
lead to frustration, and may hinder ail educative function, since it could reveal and
amplify division in the polity, thereby possibly creating conflict. This has been
strongly put forward by ‘steaith theorists’ Hibbins and Theiss-Morse, who find that
“enhanced invoivement in politics does flot have the benefits theorists daim”85. In
their view, people are flot generally interested in becoming more infomed since
time and other pressures inhibit their desire for such activity. “Reading up on
issues and extensively debating them is an additional burden [they] do not crave
nor need”86. Thus, pushing for an increase in participation may actually make
people feel bitter towards the govemment, and in some ways, less adamantin their
acceptance of basic principles of democracy.
“ Mark Mattem, “Teaching Democratic Theory Democratically”, P5: Political Science & PoÏitics
91(1997), 514
John R. Hibbins and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Steatth Democracy, 184$6 Ibid., 232
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However, data lias been presented that shows that, citizens living in states
that have and practice direct democracy, feel themselves that they are better
informed and have a better understanding of politics than others87. While Bowier
and Donovan note that citizens may feei a false sense of empowerment if ballot
measures have no consequence on poiicy, they point out that that is not the case in
practice: ballot measures do have consequences on poiicy. In addition, they show
that direct democracy rivals with education in shaping perceptions of how citizens
feel they influence the government. Furthermore, other convincing empirical
evidence has shown that participation leads to greater politicai lmowledge, and
acceptance of democratic nonns and behaviours. Jane Junn finds that
A reciprocal relationship exists between participation and political knowledge. {...]
Individuals gain cognitive skill or knowledge from the experience of participating in the political
system, and taking part in political activity enhances the level of knowledge individuals have of
their government88.
This evidence has been corroborated by Mendeisohn and Cutier, who find
that referenda tend to increase voters’ knowledge of the issues, and that this
information suppiement is flot concentrated amongst the aiready well-educated89.
For our part, we tend to agree with Rousseau and the other
‘participafionists’. After ail, it is by using a device that we get to know more about
it and understand its complexities. Politics can be compared to a game: there are
rules and reguiations that appiy and diverse strategies may be used in order to
‘ See Shaun Bowier and Todd Donovan, “Democracy, Institutions.. .‘, 383
Jane Junn, ‘Participation and Political Knowledge’, in William Crotty (cd), Political
Participation andAmerican Democracy (New York: Greewood Press, 1991), 208
Matthew Mendelsohn and fred Cutier, “The Effect of Referendums on Democratic Citizens:
Information, Politicization, Efficacy and Tolerance’, British Journal ofPolitical Science 30
(2000), 685-98
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??Wjfl!! the game. By playing more and more, we tend to leam more about the game
and its tricks and develop better strategies. While we may end up disliking the
game, we certainly know more about its workings after having played it. Thus, as
Conway notes, “participation, whether in the political or the non-political areas of
life, tends to influence individuals’ attitudes and beliefs in the direction of more
positive orientations toward both themselves and the political system”90. In
addition, it seems reasonable to believe that citizens, having a more direct contact
with policy-making, and being better aware of the consequences of these policies,
will increasingly develop a feeling of responsibility towards their peers, in the
sense that they will realize in a clearer manner the impact of their actions on
others, as well as on themselves.
Conclusion
It is our contention that direct democracy should not be left completely
unsupervised. Direct democracy should be used in combination with
representative systems. We agree with those who feel that giving more
participation to citizens is a good thing, simply because if policy decisions are to
affect their lives, then they should be actively participating in it. We have shown
the principal arguments that are made for or against the use of direct democracy
type devices, and have responded to them9. Botli sides offer valid arguments, and
° M. Margaret Conway, Politicat Participation in the United States (Washington: CQ Press,
2000), 204
91 However, other comments conceming direct democracy have also been made, arnongst them the
role of money in influencing outcomes. Among others, Cronin shows that if the money is spent in
promoting an issue, the success rate is only 25%, while if the money is used to go against an issue,
the success rate is 75%. See Thomas Cromn, Direct Democracy, chapter 5. Other scholars have
focussed more directly on the role of money in direct democracy (and in representative systems as
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it is possible for the scholar to take sides in the debate. Ail in ail, however, the
arguments in favour of direct democracy seern more convincing, and more
consistent with our own ideals about democracy and its workings. We therefore
conclude that direct democracy is a valid form of decision making, and should be
promoted.
Let us now tum to the next section: how to construct the checklist ballot.
well) and we should direct our readers to those studies. For example, Larry J. Sabato, Howard R.
Ernst and Bntce A. Larson (eds), Dangerous Democracy? The battie Over Ballot Initiatives in
America ((New York: Rowrnan & Littlefield, 2001); Betty Zisk, Money, Media, and the Grass
Roots: State Ballots Issues and the Electoral Process (Newsbury Park: Sage, 1987)
Chapter 2
Construction phase... modalïtïes for placing items on ballot
Pierre Favre reminds us that “il faut toujours se demander qui a le pouvoir
de formuler la question qui sera soumise à l’organe délibérant”92, since, as is noted
by Vincent Lemieux, “la formulation de la question est au coeur du processus
référendaire, puisque c’est autour des réponses à apporter que se fait le débat”93. In
this section, our discussion will center on how to construct the checklist ballot;
that is how to decide which items will appear on the ballot, and where and how to
place them, which basically amounts to deciding the wording of the referendum
question. After reviewing the rnethods used for ballot construction in the Jackson
and the British Columbia (B.C.) referenda, we will propose our own method of
ballot construction. It will be argued that, although the other two methods may be
efficient in certain cases, they do not permit enough citizen participation in
political processes that concem them, and leave too big a place for the government
to manipulate the wording of the question to best serve its own interests. In
addition, we shall show that our method has longer lasting effects, helping to form
more civic minded and interested citizens.
92 Pierre Favre, La décision de majorité (Paris: Presses de la fondation nationale des science
politiques, 1976), 122
Vincent Lemieux, “La formulation de la question”, in Collectif, Démocratie et reférendum: la
procédure reférendaire (Montréal: Québec!Amérique, 1992), 95
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At the heart of our concem with ballot construction is the impact that the
referendum question lias on voting intentions and outcomes94. As William Riker
notes:
Outcomes are the consequences flot only of institutions and tastes, but also of the political
skill and artistry of those who manipulate agenda, formulate and reformulate questions, generate
“false” issues, etc., in order to exploit the disequilibrium oftastes for their own advantage95.
Similarly, Boyer reminds us that “ambiguity in wordings which give rise to
more than one interpretation of the question (and subsequently of the resuit),
defeats the purpose of the vote?T96. William Jacoby, in an article on different
framings of public spending, convincingiy shows that public opinion does change
with different presentations of the issues; thus, varying issue presentations may
actually change citizens’ responses on the issues97. His analysis also confirms the
expressly political nature of the issue-framing process. This is further evidenced
by the work of Pinard et al. They show that in the case of Quebec sovereignty,
using the terms separation, independence, or souveraineté gamered different
leveis of approval, while ail three terms conjure up a similar idea of secession98.
We must recognize Howard Scarrow’s contention that ballot format impacts vary with
characteristics ofindividual voters. Thus, some electors, more than others, may be influenced by a
particular format. However, it should be noted that his contention stems from research on ballots in
partisan elections, flot referendums. See “Ballot Format in Plurality Partisan Elections” in Arend
Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds), Electorat Laws and their Politicat C’onsequences (New York:
Agathon Press, 1986), 242-247
William H. Riker, “Implications from the Disequilibrium ofMajority Rule for the Study of
Institutions”, American Political Science Review 74 (1980), 445
96 Boyer, Lawmaking by the People, 17
‘ William G. Jacoby, “Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending”, American
Journal ofPolitical Science 44 (2000), 750-767. A sirnilar argument is made by lan Shapiro as he
notes that “members ofa winning majority may have voted differently had the alternatives been
presented in a different order”. See “Three Fallacies Conceming Majorities, Minorities, and
Democratic Politics” in John W. Chapman and Alan Wertheimer (eds), Majorities andMinorities
(New York: New York University Press, 1990), 97. For his part, Zaller shows that adding a
preamble to the question can modify a respondent’s answers. See The Nature aiid Origins ofMass
Opinion, (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 1992), 82-83
Maurice Pinard, Robert Bemier et Vincent Lemieux, Un combat inachevé (Québec: Les presses
universitaires du Québec, 1997), 35-37
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The government (usually the PQ), being aware of these fluctuations, tends to
favour presenting the project in a way that permits it to get as mucli votes as it cari
from soft nationalists, those people who, while flot favounng total independence,
are eager for a renegotiation of Quebec’s place in Canada.
The Quebec premier is accurately aware that a hard’ question on sovereignty, no matter
how cleverly phrased, stands littie chance of being accepted by even a slim majority of the
provinces voters. [...] As many recent surveys have discovered, Quebecs voters are more
susceptible to the lure of sovereignty when it is coupled with offer of a new relationship with the
rest ofthe country.99
Similar resuits were also found by other authors. In an experimental study
conducted during the 1992 Charlottetown referendum to see if wording of the
question had any impact on voting intentions, Johnston et al. found that certain
wordings indeed produced more acceptance of the accor&00. In the case of the
1975 English referendum on the European Common Market, Butler and Kitzinger
show that the government had prepared and tested six alternative questions to find
which one would best secure approval oftheir prefened option’°’. We can thus see
that referendum questions are crucial, as they are easily turned and twisted in ways
that could ensure that the government’s option gets the most approval from the
eÏectorate. However, this conclusion should be tempered by the fact that the
studies mentioned here establish a link between the referendum question and
voting intentions as measured by opinion polis. Thus, it could be correctly
Barry Came, “We the people: Jacques Parizeau unveils Quebec’s referendum question”,
Maclean’s 108, September 18, 1995, 12-16.
‘°° See Richard Johnston, André Biais, Elizabeth Giddengil and Neil Nevitte, The Challenge of
Direct Democracy: the 1992 C’anadian Referendum (Monfreal: McGilI-Queens’ University Press,
1996), 300 (fn.30). These resuits were, however, only found in Quebec.
‘°‘ See David Butier and Uwe Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum (London: Macmillan press, 1976),
60. Difference in approvai rates varied from +0,2 to +16,2%.
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hypothesized that across a referendum campaign, the effect of the question could
wane in favour of more pointed debates on the referendum issues themselves, and
that these debates would orient actual voting intentions with more gist than the
wording ofthe referendum question itself.
The method that was used in Iackson will be called ‘executive’, and the one
used in B.C. will be called ‘executive with consultation’. Our proposed method
shah be referred to as the ‘deliberative’ method. As we have stated in the
introductory pages of this thesis, it brings together elements taken from different
deliberative settings. While our method proposes somewhat similar methods of
participant and expert selection, as well as similar processes of deliberation as the
other deliberative settings, we differ from these other methods in regards to the
ends that we postulate. Our deliberants are not posed as consultants from whom
power structures can daim legitimacy, but rather as full-fledged decision-makers:
they have the final say over the construction of the ballot, of what the wording of
the referendum question wihl 5e. In this sense, our method resembles closely the
idea of ‘demarchy’:
The key decïsion-making processes occur in the functional groups: These are groups of
citizens chosen randomly [...] who make decisions in particular areas. [...] Member’s expertise
initially is quite limited, but even so, policy juries soon become, on a collective basis, quite
knowledgeable’°2
Working on our dual assumption that the construction of the checklist
ballot should contribute to both increasing actual citizen participation, and
decreasing the manipulative capacities of the goveming bodies in presenting the
02 Lyri Carson and Brian Martin, Random Selection in Politics (Westport: Praeger, 1999), 104-5
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referendum option(s) (in une with the analytical framework defined in the opening
pages of this essay), we feel these dual goals are best achieved through the
‘deliberative rnethod’ that we propose.
The ‘executive’ method
In Jackson, Mississippi, there were no public consultations regarding the
spending initiatives that were to be put forward on the ballot. The checklist ballot’s
construction was entirely the work of the executive committee in charge of school
affairs. As noted by Glaser,
First, lie [Dr. Ben Canada, superintendent of the city’s schools] and the School Commiftee
identified the ten most important infrastructure needs in the district. With that in hand, they put
together a bond issue that was actually ten “mini’ bond issues’°3.
This example illustrates what we cal! the ‘executive’ method: where
citizens are flot consu!ted in the process of constructing the ballot. The method’s
principal flaw is that it gives too much power to the goveming bodies in
constntcting the ballot; it aÏlows them the liberty to choose themselves what items
will be placed on the ballot, depending on the importance they give to certain
issues rather than to others.
It should be stressed that the last time a school bond had managed to pass
in Jackson was in 1964, when Mississippi was the on!y state in the nation that had
103 Glaser, “White Voters, Black Schools...”, 37. In my correspondence with James Glaser, he
offers additional details about how the ballot was designed: “In talking with the designers of the
Jackson checklist, I know they made a conscïous decision to put things on the checklist that they
didn’t expect to pass, but they wanted to give people the opportunity to say ‘no’ to sornething. They
also put the items they cared most about higher on the list. They didn’t want to get a ‘no no no’
pattem going’.
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not even started to integrate its school. At the time when the checkiist was used,
while the city was in majority white, the population in public schools was mainly
black. Furthermore, in 1950, the Mississippi legislature had passed a 60 percent
rule, following which no school bond could pass without obtaining at least a 60%
approval from the electorate. The problem, then, was to find a way to gamer
enough support from white folks for spending that would go in large part to the
black population. In this sense, one could be tempted to infer that in such a
particular situation, a speciai device was needed; probabiy a common and
calculated effort on the part of officiais to make sure the bonds wouid pass. As
Glaser shows, had it not been for the concerted efforts of officials, the bond (or
bonds) would neyer have passed the 60% mark. Even with this effort, only three
bond issues passed, with the highest support gamering only 3,24 percentage points
more than what was required’°4. In the same vein, one could also argue that
representatives, having been elected by the people in a democratic way, have a
legitimate daim of taiking and acting in the name of the people; giving them the
task of constructing the ballot would merely be a form of sovereignty delegation
on the part ofthe public.
To these two arguments we retort that the goal of this thesis (and this
ballot) is to increase actual political participation by the public, while at the same
time decreasing the possibilities of government manipulation of the referendum
presentation and thus, of the outcomes. As a resuit, we believe that we should
promote ways in which the public digs in and participates directly, on its own, in
‘°‘ Glaser, Ibid. (table 1)
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the institutional (ballot construction), as well as in the voting process, instead of
simply being cast as a rubber stamp to approve or disapprove government options
inside parameters set, and decided upon, at the elite level.
To conclude, whule we may recognize this method’s usefulness in certain
rare and special cases, the ‘executive’ method does not appear to be an optimal
approach for constructing a checklist ballot.
The ‘executive with consultation’ method
For its May 2002 referendum on treaty negotiations involving Native
people, the government of British Columbia proceeded with public consultations.
As is stated in an officiai document released by the Select Standing Committee on
Aboriginal Affairs:
The Committee is inviting written submissions and conducting regional public hearings to
hear evidence from British Columbians on this topic. A series of public hearings vil1 be held in
October where interested individuals and organizations may appear before the Commiftee to
present their recommendations. The information provided at the public hearing and in the written
submissions will forrn the basis of the Conunittee’s report. The final report and its
recommendations wil] assist the government in preparing questions that will be put to ail British
Columbians in a one-time, province-wide referendum.’°5
We call this method “executive with consultation”: the government takes
on some sort of public consultations conceming the referendum to be held.
105 Legislative Assembly ofBritish-Columbia, news release, Treaty Referendum Hearings setfor
Vancouver Island, released Oct. 23rd 2001, p4. The Committee held consultations November 1-2
on Vancouver Island. In addition, wriften submissions could be sent until November 2. These
consultation were meant to help the committee produce a report which would be released the
November 30t11 2001. The referendum xvas a mail-in ballot that had to be sent back by May 15th
2002. See Appendix I for an example ofthe ballot.
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following these consultations, it produces the ballot that is to be put to
referendum. What cornes out of the public consultations is, however, not binding
for the governing bodies, and it is really their choice to follow or flot what citizens
have told them.
Public consultations can have two benefits, one of legitirnization and one
of input, On input, public consultations can serve as a means to probe public
opinion, and also to get outside expertise on the subject’°6. Public consultations
can also be held in an effort to legitimize a particular process. In this case, the
desired objective is to present the image that the public was an integral part of the
referendum process. Both are not mutually inclusive, as you can have one without
having the other. In the case of British Columbia, the authorities were clearly
looking for legitimacy to corne out oftheir consultations, as evidenced by the way
these were handled. The actual public consultations were only held for two days,
and in only three locations (Nanaimo, Port Albemi and Carnpbell River). In
addition, people wanting to send written submissions only had a couple of months
to prepare their report and send it. Thus, even on the legitimacy front, the process
was a disaster. Angus Reid called it “one of the most amateurish, one-sided
attempts to gauge the public will that I have seen in my professional career”107.
106 Maiy Grisez Kweit and Robert W. Kweït show that even in bureaucratie systems, information
from outside sources (like citizens) is valuable in increasing information available to decision
makers, despïte complexity. This input eau help provide a more comprehensive picture on ail
aspects ofthe policy process. See “The Politics ofPolicy Analysis: The Role ofCitizen
Participation in Analytic Decision Making”, in Jack DeSario and Stuart Langton (eds), Citizen
Participation in Public Decision Making (New York: Policy studies organization, 1987), 19-37
(07 David Charbonneau, “Wacky Referendum Takes Province Back Through the Looking Glass”,
Kamtoops Daity News, April 2002. Later in the article, we can read: “Take the first question,
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Here again, the method does flot satisfy our pre-stated conditions for
increased actual citizen political participation, and a decrease of manipulation by
the government. In this case, the major obstacle is that even if there are some
forms of consultation, these consultations are not binding for the goveming
bodies. Therefore, we find here a similar problem as with the ‘executive’ method:
too much power is given to the governing bodies in deciding what shape the ballot
will take. Could we argue that this was also a special case? We are pretty sure
some form of argument could be made108. However, particularity can only go so
far, and in light of our analytical frarnework, this method must be put aside.
Method 3: the “deliberative” method
In light of the above review, we are now set to propose our own method,
which is based on elements taken from Fishkin’s deliberative opinion polls’°9,
from consensus conferences’1° and from citizen’ juries. In its ensemble, it
resembles ‘demarchy’; where a group of ordinary citizens is selected and brought
together to deliberate and decide upon pieces of legislation. The cmx of the
argument rests on the principle that ail people affected by a policy should be
for example. It breaks one ofthe basic rules for writing referendum questions
— it states the
question in the negative”.
108 Having flot yet signed a “peace ofthe braves’ with the Natives, and constrained by the
Delgamuukv decisions requiring that provincial governments negotiate in good faith territorial
treaty negotiations with the Natives, the govemment of3.C. did flot have ail the latitude it could
have enjoyed under other circumstances. Here again, one could say special ends need special
means.
09 See Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation; Tue Voice of the People (New Haven: Yale
university press, 1995)
110 Sec for example Simon Joss and Joim Durant, Public Participation in Science: The Role of
Consensus onferences in Europe (London: Science museum, 1995)
Sec for example J. Stewart, E. Kendail and A. Coote, Citizen Juries (London: IPPR, 1994); A.
Coote and J. Lenaghan, Citizens’Juries: Theoiy Into Practice (London: IPPR, 1997)
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involved in the making of that policy. Our rationale is that citizens, deliberating
amongst thernselves, will be able to arrive at a decision that is more reflective of
their preferences than would deliberation and decision-making restricted at the
elite level only.
The argument also rests on the idea that people will, through deliberation
and justification of their positions, be able to better understand the rationale for
conflicting positions, and be open to change their views in light of ‘the better
argumentT. Recognizing the evidence brought by Converse”2 and Za11er113 that
people have ill-conceived opinions, deliberative democrats postulate that by
providing information to citizens, and making them deliberate together, they will
change their preferences in ways that make them get a better understanding of the
global picture, and strive in more positive ways towards the greater good114 Thus,
even if, as has been presented by some, citizens’ opinions on the aggregate appear
quite coherent”5, the impetus here is to achieve coherence in the individual;
making the individual herselfbecome, through deliberation and information input,
more coherent in her beliefs, and in the rationale(s) that guide these beliefs. It is
our view that “no intellectually defensible daim can be made that policy elites
[...] possess superior knowledge or more specifically superior knowledge ofwhat
constitutes the public good”6.
112 Sec Converse, “The Nature ofBelief Systems in Mass Publics”
113 Sec Zaller, The Nature and Origins ofMass Opinion
HI Sec James S. fishkin, Robert C. Lusldn and Roger Joweli, “Deliberative Polling and Public
Consultation”, ParÏiainentarv Affairs 53 (2000), 657-666
115 Sec Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, The Rational Public: Ffty Years of Tre,,ds in
American Policy Preferences (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992)
116 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, (Net’.’ Haven: Yale university press, 1989), 337
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While we accept the theoretical framework of other deliberative methods,
we diverge from them in the end effect of this deliberation. For proponents of
these methods, the goal is merely descriptive. As fishkin states, a deliberative
opinion poli “lias a recommending force: these are the conclusions people would
corne to, were they better informed on the issues and had the opportunity and
motivation to examine those issues seriousiy”117 This is pretty much what is
expected of consensus conferences, where the recommendations in the report of
the deliberants may be used discretionarily by the government’ ‘. Citizen juries
tend to go a bit further. Even if the recommendations they make are flot binding, if
the sponsoring body (usually the government) does not act upon these
recommendations, it must explain why’
We wish to take ail of this a step further. Our deliberants will be ftilly in
charge of constructing the checklist ballot. They wili flot just make
recommendations on its appearance, but rather make binding recommendations of
what the referendum question should be. This does flot mean that all technical
aspects of the deliberative setting will be lefi in their hands, but rather that they
F ishkin, Tue Voice ofthe People, 162. For him these deliberative polis simpiy “modeis what he
public woztld think, if it had a more adequate chance to think about the questions at issue”. See
Democracy and Delïberation, 1
‘ See Daniel Boy, Dominique Donnet Kamel et Philippe Roqueplo, “Un exemple de démocratie
participative: la ‘conférence de citoyens’ sur les organismes génétiquement modifiés”, Revue
française de science politique 50 (2000), 806. In this particuiar case, the govemment did go aiong
with many reconm-iendations made in the consensus conference. However, this does flot appear to
be a standard practice.
119 See Graham Smith and Corinne Wales, “Citizens’ Juries and Deliberative Democracy”,
Politicat Stttdies 48 (2000), 51-65; For Ward and ctl., the reason that citizens’ juries’
recommendations are not binding is so there is no tension between the juries and elected officiais.
See Hugh Ward, Aletta Norval, Todd Landman and Juies Pretty, “Open Citizens’ Juries and the
Politics of Sustainabiiity”, Political Studies 51(2003), 282-99
43
will have the final say on the ballot’s content and appearance. Hence, we expect
that by bringing together a group of non-expert citizens, giving them balanced and
adequate information on a certain policy issue, and by having them deliberate in a
proper setting, we will be able to make this group sufficiently knowledgeable so
they can have a greater and more balanced appreciation of the problem at hand,
and thus make appropriate, binding recommendations to public officiais. This wiil
allow for a greater feeling of invoivernent in political processes on the part of
citizens. In addition, it would greatly improve the legitirnacy of the referendum
process and ofthe outcomes as weii.
How cloes it work?
We first present a brief outiine of our method, and we get into more details
ofparticular aspects further on. The process briefly resumed goes as follows.
The governnient cornes up with a set of propositions and ideas it wants to
put forward by way of referendum. for example, in the case of spending
initiatives, the govenmient wouid corne up with ideas and targets of spending they
wish to promote. These ideas wouid presented by the governrnent in the form ofa
list of pre-written items, which would serve as a basis for the deliberant assembiy
to work upon, and modify as they wish. This wouid allow the assembly to have
some sort of foundation to start from, and wouid also be an indicator of who
initiates the project, in what capacity and towards what goals, giving a ciearer
indication of the direction the sponsoring body would like the assembly to take.
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Following this, the government randomly selects a certain number of citizens.
Once selected, these citizens wouÏd be handed an informative manual, containing
balanced and nuanced information explaining the pros and cons about each option
(item) the governinent wouid like to push through. Neutrality of this manuaPs
content could be ensured by either the two following ways. One way would be to
ask for an independent body to write up the manual, whiie another would be to ask
the govemment to write the Pro arguments, and have the opposition parties write
up the Cons.
Then, before the deliberative proceedings start as such, some preparatory
meetings would be set in place to ensure that: 1) ail the deliberants have adequate
basic information on the subj cet they will deliberate upon; 2) some bonds of trust
and amicability are formed, which are crucial to a proper deliberation setting; 3)
there is flexibility in expert/elite selection as the deliberative public moves through
the process. Since the deliberants do flot necessarily know who the experts are and
how to reach them, the government would initially select them. They could
however demand that certain types of experts be brought forward instead of or in
addition to others, as the process goes along.
These citizens are then brought together in a single location so there is
face-to-face discussion amongst them20. To assist them in their deliberation and
120 This exact format ofthe bridging is flot rigid. While we recommend physical presence as ways
to promote deliberation and debate (similar to jury duties), Dahi argues that physical presence is
flot required, since telecommunication can bring people together in just the same manner. See
Democracy and its Critics, 340. F. Christopher Arterton points to siniilar uses of
45
proceedings, a professional moderator, neutral and trained in group cohabitation,
would be present. He would supervise the proceedings. There would also be a
group of scholars and other dites (business, interest groups, citizen groups...) that
would be present to help answer questions the citizens would have, to explain why
they stand for certain policies rather than others, and to ensure the legality of the
outcomes.
Following this, a period of deliberation exclusively amongst the
deliberating citizens would take place, after which the group would corne up with
the ballot to be put to a referendum. 0f course, the actual period of deliberation
could flot be very long since financial constraints should be taken into
consideration. In addition, one should not underestimate the fact that citizens
would not ail be too happy or willing to be taken away from their usual business
for this exercise. A good way to rnake this participation less burdensorne would be
to compensate the participants. As is noted by Carson and Martin,
Payment is one way of both rewarding and valuing participants contribution, as
well as a means of compensating them for time and/or wages forgone. [...] It does allow for
participation by those otherwise unable to attend and shows that participants’ input is valued’21.
We now move to a more detailed presentation of our ‘deliberative method’.
How are participants to be setected?
telecommunications as tools for bringing together citizens and promoting participation, albeit as a
tool for improving representative democracy. See “Political Participation anti ‘Teledemocracy”,
PSPoliticaÏ Science and Politics 21(1988), 620-27. This joins Slatons idea of televoting. See
Christa Daryl Siaton, Televote: Expanding Citizen Participation in the Quantum Age (New York:
Praeger, 1992)
121 Carson and Martin, Random Selection in Decision Making, 93
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While calling for ail those affected by policy making to be consulted, it
would be foolish to hope such would happen, albeit perhaps in very small
communities. In addition, if ail affected could 5e brought together, there would
probably be a shift from deliberation to speech-making, since citizens would form
too numerous a group to entail proper deliberation. This is what Parkinson calis
the scale problern122. Thus, sorne form of selection of the participants is needed.
We believe that random selection is the best method to select participants: “the use
of random selection in decision making is a way of being fair and being seen to be
fair. It is especially valuable when other methods leave open a suspicion ofbias or
conflict of interest”23. It ensures that there is no initial bias in the selection of
participants favouring one group or another. It ensures, additionally, that
goveming bodies cannot manipulate the selection procedure to ensure participants
fit certain characteristics preferred by these bodies. In this sense, “random
selection [...] eliminates seif-selection and prevents any interest group from
influencing who is chosen”24. Also, inherent to its logic, it ensures that the
deliberative assembly will be a proportional reflection of group presence in the
wider polity, which entails that a wider and truer range of ideas wiii be exchanged.
It thus gives a strong legitimacy to the process of selection and ofdeliberation.
However, we are reminded that proportionality as such is flot always an
optimal choice, as some authors have pointed to certain defects of proportional
122 John Parkinson, ‘Legitimacy Problems in Deliberative Dernocracy”, Political Studies 51
(2003), 180-96
23 Carson and Martin, Random Selection in Decision Making, 15
124 Lyn Carson and Brian Martin, ‘Random Selection ofCitizens for Technological Decision
Making”, Science & Public Policy 29 (2002), 112
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representation. For example, Smith and Wales denote four problems: first, no
selected jury mirrors ail standpoints and opinions of the wider community.
Second, there is a danger of creating false essentiatism: for example, shou!d the
wornen seiected be obliged to represent views of ail women in the wider
community, and can they125? Third, does proportionality imply that one cannot
represent interests of others that do not share lis dharacteristics? Lastly, should
participants selected represent fixed views, formed before the proceeding, or
should the participants be encouraged to change their minds’26? Parkinson points
to another flaw: proportionality would entai! reproducing outside inequa!ities into
the deliberative bodies, thus maintaining the usua! majority/minority status127. For
him, the solution to this wou!d be an equalitarian representation. This means that
groups representing minor strata of populations cou!d have as many delegates as
majoritarian groups. For examp!e, groups !ike the Natives, who comprise tiny
fractions of the population, could see their representation in the deliberative
setting be equa! to that ofwhites.
These criticisms, however, pertain to a mode of proportionality that would
cail for deliberants to be de!egates of the wider polity, whule in reality we want
them to be trustees. The de!egate version requires the representative to min-or the
views of those he is said to represent. In this case, men would represent men’s
125 As noted by Carson and Martin, “feminists have wrestled with the shortcomings of seeing
women as a homogeneous group, knowing that the life of a single black working mother in New
York is very different from that ofa married white childless female in Kansas’. Sec Random
Selection in Decision Making, 91
126 Sec Smith and Wales, “Citizens’ Juries and Deliberative Democracy”, 56-57
127 Sec Parkinson, “Legitimacy Problems in Deliberative Democracy”, 189
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views; women would do the same for women; and blacks for blacks, and so on128.
In this sense, if deliberants were delegates, reproducing majority/minority statuses
of the wider community in the deliberant assembly could indeed be a cause of
concem. However, another view is that of the trustee; the representative must be
free to exercise bis own judgement on issues. The deliberant who takes part in this
deliberative process does flot come as representing blacks or women, professors or
unions or whatever; he comes as a citizen concemed with solving a policy
problem. In light of deliberative democracy, it is imperative that the citizens
chosen have the maximum liberty to change their opinions and compromise, since
this is the basis of the deliberative argument. In this sense, the logical conclusion
would be to have deliberants play the role of trustees. We expect random selection
to make it even more evident that the deliberants are flot representatives of any
core of the population, but that they shouÏd act as trustees. In addition, “citizen
participation may have more beneficial effects in structures that do flot tend to
force a strong connection between participants as persons and their political
opinions”129
Having opted to select the deliberants randomly, we run up against another
question: ShouÏd participant selection be from ail of the population or only from
voiunteers? This is an important question, since some deliberative methods have
28 Jane Mansbridge, for example, is one proponent ofthis form of representation. However, she
prefers what she calis descriptive representation. This type does flot only encompass visible
characteristic (gender or race for example), but also shared experiences. However, she believes this
form ofrepresentation is best used in certain historical circumstances that do flot fit our context,
neither our deliberant group. See ‘ShoulU Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent
Women? A Contingent ‘Yes”’, The Journal ofPolitics 61(1999), 62 8-657
129 Michael E. Morreil, “Citizens’ Evaluations ofParticipatory Democratic Procedures: Normative
Theory Meets Empirical Science”, PolïtïcaÏ Research Quarteriy 52 (1999), 315
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used volunteer recruitment in the initial stage of recruitment, and this could be
cause for concem. For example, in the case ofAustralia’s consensus conference on
gene technology, selection was done through advertisement during a period of a
week, and out of those who responded, random selection was used to choose who
would finally get to deliberate 130 Altematively, in the Australian ‘citizen jury’ on
container deposit legislation, recruitment was initially done through random
mailing’31.
These practices could engender criticism on the grounds of
unrepresentativeness. For example, Brady et al. show that recruited participation
and self-selected (volunteer) participation give a biased view of what really exists
in the poïity, since they usuaÏly eau on more knowledgeable and participatory
publics than what is actually found in the poÏity. Thus, both these processes do flot
bring into political processes people who are usually kept at the margin, or who do
flot usually participate politically. “The resuit is that policymakers [...] hear even
more disproportionately from those who command the resources that make
participation possible”32. In addition, evidence shows that participation is
explained by resources, and that different resources lead to different modes of
participation. In the case of activities that take time, the main explicative resources
30 See Alison Mohr, ‘0f Being Seen to do the Right Thing: Provisional Findings From the First
Australian Consensus Conference on Gene Teclmology in the food Chain”, Science & Public
Policy 29 (2002), 2-12
131 Carson and Martin, “Random Selection ofCitizens for Tecimological Decision Making”
132 Henry E. Brady, Kay Lehman Schlozman and Sidney Verba, “Prospecting for Participants:
Rational Expectations and the Recruitment of Polïtical Activists”, Ainerican Political Science
Review 93 (1999), 1M
50
are civic skiiis and interest133. The fact that these resources are unequaiiy
distributed in the polity expiains why recruitment from voiunteers would make for
a group of deliberants that does flot represent the wider polity, in its group
distribution and in its political knowledge and interest leveis. Thus, it is our
contention that participants should be seiected from ail concemed, i.e. from ail the
polity. This ensures that “there is no group of selectors who can be accused of
bias, because nobody can know in advance who wiii be chosenu]34.
Finaiiy, to give an approximate figure, probabiy flot more than a hundred
participants shouid be seiected for this exercise.
How are experts and other elites selected?
Experts and elites wouid be selected based on to their knowiedge and
expertise of the subject at hand. This wouid entaii schoiars and poiicy experts,
business groups and the likes, which have some fonn of iink to the question at
hand, to be present. Pariiamentary officiais, flot only members of govemment,
should aiso be brought in to present and justify their position, and aiso to heip the
deliberants on technical matters. Legai experts wouid ensure the legaiity and the
coherence of the outcomes. 0f importance then is that these eiites not only be
weii-rounded on the topic, but also that their views range across the whole
spectrum of the debate; for example, on a project involving government spending,
it would be important to have, at the same time, liberai-type, market oriented
133 Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba and Kay Lehman Schlozman, “Beyond SES: A Resource Model
ofPolitical Participation’, Ainerican Political Science Review 89 (1995), 271-294
“ Carson and Martin, “Random Selection ofCitizens for Technological Decision Making’, 107
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people as well as more socially-conscious scholars and experts, so that the citizen
group can have access to a balanced advice.
As the deliberants are not expected to know who the experts are, and how
to reach them, an initial process of selection will be done by the sponsoring body
(the govenirnent), where a list of experts and elites will be drawn up. Neutrality in
this list could be achieved in the same two ways as for the information manual
mentioned earlier. Thus, one way would be for an independent body to draw up a
list, while another would be for the government to draw up a list of experts and
have the opposition parties do the same, eventualïy combining the two selections
into one single list. From this list the deliberants could choose what kind of expert
they want to hear and question. The deliberants would also have the flexibility of
choosing more or different ones as they go along’35.
How to guarantee that the cletiberative settings will be effective?
As noted by Elton Reeves, “group effectiveness is directly proportionate to
the willingness ofmembers to work hard”36. Here cornes into play the question of
context. “Deliberation requires conditions that will effectively motivate citizens to
The importance ofthis point is made by Srnith and Wales, ‘Citizen Dunes and Deliberative
Democracy”, 58; also by Daniel Boy, Dominique Donnet Kamel et Philippe Roqueplo, “Un
exemple de démocratie participative”, 793. Alison Mohr, noting criticisms from a lay panellist she
interviewed following the Australian consensus conference on gene technology, makes a similar
point. The participant was adamant that to improve quality ofthe conferences, the panel should
choose the experts, for he feit there was too much bias when the sponsoring body chose the dites.
See Mohr, “On Being Seen to do the Right Thing”, 9
136 Elton T. Reeves, The Dynamic of Group Behaviour (New York: American management
associations inc., 1970), 332
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invest time and effort in information-gathering and face-to-face discussion”37.
James Bohman resurnes best the theoretical, ideal setting for deliberation:
The inclusion of everyone affected by a decision, substantial political equality including
equal opportunities to participate in the deliberation, equality in methods for decision making and
in determining the agenda, the free and open exchange of information and reasons sufficient to
acquire an understanding ofboth the issue in question and the opinions ofothers’38.
In practice, creating an appropriate context for deliberation is a crucial
aspect of the operation, and it is sometimes harder to achieve than expected, as
evidenced by Robert Futrell’s study of a city commission139. In his study, Futreil
finds that many aspects of a deliberative setting can discourage or hinder effective
participation. For example, he reports that certain spatial factors, such as the
distance between people and the moderator, or certain elernents of clothing and
language can affect the interactions amongst participants. Thus, the physical
setting of the deliberation must make participants feel at ease in exchanging point
of views and confronting each other on their diverse viewpoints. It must be cozy
and neutral, where elements of superiority or authority are not seen or feit by the
participants, or at least minimized.
The process also rests on the recognition of certain formai and informai
rules. This is where the role of a moderator cornes into play. The moderator is a
fundamental element of the deliberative setting. He must have no link to any
137 Fishkin, The Voice ofthe People, 142
138 James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralisin, C’omplexity, and Dernocracy (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1996), 16
139 See Robert futreil, “La gouvemance performative: maîtrise des impressions, travail d’équipe et
contrôle du conflit dans les débats d’une city commission”, Politix 15 (2002), 147-165
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political party, but simply be a professional expert in handiing and directing group
dynamics. He must be neutral, and it is imperative that he be able to pass on and
reflect this neutrality. Though lie will be chosen by the sponsoring body, he must
make sure he does flot influence the debates by giving personal opinions. Actually,
some critics of detiberative democracy have charged that apparent change in
preferences may not be due to the deliberative act itseif, but rather to extemal
sources of influence, like the tendency to go in the direction wanted by the
sponsoring body, here represented by the moderator’40. Others, like Mohr, note
that the relationship between the moderator and the deliberants can be difficult.
She points to the fact that in the UK national consensus conference, the panel
suspended its collaboration with the moderator because it feit lie was too intrusive
in his relation with the group’41.
However, others have reported no problems with the moderator’42. In light
of the above, we cannot but repeat, even if it may sound like wishful thinking, our
contention that the moderator must imperatively ensure he does not in anyway
influence deliberants to go in one direction or another. His principal role is to
facilitate discussion between deliberants, encourage mutual respect, and make sure
that ail processes flow smoothly. This could create what Reeves cails synergy in
the group, where individuals recognize the benefits of collective concerted activity
in reaching goals and attaining objectives, which is a crucial component for group
140 This remark is made in Loic Blondiaux, ‘Sondage et délibération: une épistémologie
alternative de l’opinion publique?”, Politix 15 (2002), 164-80
‘‘ Mohr, “On Bemg Seen to do the Right Thing”, 7
142 For example, Carson and Martin, “Random Selection ofCitizens for Technological Decision
Making”,
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effectiveness’43. If it does indeed sound like wishful thinking, this does flot seem
to us an impossible task, albeit a very dernanding one, and one that must be carried
out diligenfly. Certainly, very few people can boast to being completely neutral.
This highlights, we believe, the importance of choosing an appropriate moderator,
able to conduct this task in the most professional and discrete fashion, while being
realist in flot expecting complete unbiassness on his part.
Another fact that should be taken into consideration is that flot ail people
have the same ability to express their ideas in clear ways, and do not rejoice from
others’ attention in the same manner. Thus it could be that even in the deliberative
setting, inequalities will arise, where some people will be better able to put across
their ideas and influence, since some people have more facility to speak in public,
and express and justify their opinions to others. This is another aspect of the
moderator’s role that is crucial: lie must make sure that people have equal
opportunity to express themseives. As Fishkin notes about his deliberative pou in
Texas, “the groups were lead by trained chairmen who made sure that ail sides of
the question got answered. ‘There is no wrong answers’ everybody was told; this
helped to keep the discussion surprisingly civil”144 This does not automatically
presume that everyone should have equai time to speak; rather, eacli participant
should feel that he lias had the chance and opportunity to express himself as much
as lie wanted. The moderator must also ensure and promote respect arnongst the
deliberants.
‘ Reeves, The Dynarnic of Group Behaviour, 335-6
‘i” Cited in ‘Democracy in Texas: The Frontier Spirit”, The Economist 347, no. 8068 (1998), 31
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Finally, he should ensure that the deliberations stay on course. This does
flot mean the deliberants must strictly follow a predetermined path, but rather that
they stick with the subject of deliberation. Gilbert Larochelle, analyzing the
government of Quebec’s “commission sur l’avenir du Québec” notes that the
quality of the debate, rests on it being indeterminate in its outcomes. This is why
we point to the fact that the moderator should ensure that the debate stays on track
(the subject), while keeping the outcome in the hands of the participants
(direction)’45. This concem is of particular importance due to the fact that
temporal constraints will be present.
Should the detiberants reach a consensual decision, or should they reach a
majority decision?
Some have argued that the act of deliberation will produce a form of
consensual accord between participants, related in part to the recognition of
certain common values amongst deliberants. Joshua Cohen, for example, writes:
“deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus
— to find reasons
that are persuasive to ah”146. However, while the formation of a consensus by the
dehiberants would be an ideal situation, requiring a consensus is another thing, and
strong arguments against consensus make us doubtful of its usefulness in this
particular setting. As noted by Ward et al.
145 See Gilbert Larochelle, “Espaces publics et démocratie: l’expérience des commissions sur
l’avenir du Québec”, Revue française de science politiqtte 50 (2000), 8 11-839.
146 See Joshua Cohen, “The Economic Basis ofDeliberative Democracy”, Social Philosophy &
Policy 6 (1989), 33
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Deliberation may transcend solutions that are a function of pre-given positions, through
leaming, arriving at common interpretations, or deeper mutual sympathy. Pushing too quickly for
consensus may preclude this and lead to the evenmal disintegration of agreement147.
One point that should be taken into consideration is the weight of
extremists in consensual decisions. As Miller shows, members that have more
extreme positions can exert more influence when requirement is consensus than
when it is majority’48. Another aspect that should be taken into consideration is
that consensus can sometirnes only be in appearance. As noted by Claude Ryan,
“Il faut se méfier de ces unanimités de surface derrière lesquelles se cachent
souvent des maux plus graves que les divergences tant redoutées”49. Thus,
consensus can actually hide substantial disagreements between participants, and
may actually hinder the process’s smooth movement, particularly in the case when
what some participants perceive to have sacrificed for reaching consensus is more
important than what they feel others have sacrificed to reach the same goal. This
may cause resentment and bad publicity for the process, and may hinder the
willingness to conduct further deliberative settings. It may also be used by
authorities or members of the wider public to discredit the process. To leave
maximum flexibility to the deliberant body, then, we would require them to reach
a majority decision.
147 Sec Ward, Norval, Landman and Pretty, “Open Citizens’ Juries and the Politics of
Sustainability”, 287. Further, they note, “lack of consensus may signal [...] the need for longer
debate”.
148 Charles E. Miller, “Group Decision Making Under Majority and Unanimity Decision Rules”,
Social Psychology Quarterty 48 (1 985),5 8
149 Sec Claude Ryan, Les comités: esprit et méthodes (Montréal: Institut canadien d’éducation des
adultes, 1962), 231
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One could charge that flot requiring consensus would flot put enough
pressure on the deliberants to strive to change their minds in light of a better
argument. One could also argue that Iack of disagreement about the conclusions
may be used by outsiders to discredit the process, and the decisions may be flot
taken very seriously by the public and the govemment’50. While recognizing these
objections, it should also be recognized that forcing a consensus would put too
much pressure on the whole process, since consensus formation tends to push
aside the fact that some preferences are very strong. In this sense, the search for
consensus would be unnecessarily burdensome for the process, and could lead to
the failure ofthe whole process.
This being said, even if it is not demanded as such, we can postulate that
the group has all incentives, by way of negotiations and deliberation, to reach a
consensual decision as they would want to take pride in their participation, and in
the success of this deliberative setting. As is noted by a participant in Norway’s
first medical consensus conference:
Precisely that coercion to reach an agreement [...] it does something to you: sharpens your
concentration, makes you bring out your willingness to compromise and flot stand stubbomly on
idiosyncratic positions, makes you build something out ofthat’51.
In addition, there is no clear relationship between the deliberants
acceptance and evaluation of the process, and the fact that they voted or flot with
150 See Ida-Elisabeth Andersen and Bfrgit Jaeger, “Scenario Workshops and Consensus
Conferences: Towards More Democratic Decision-Making, Science & Public Policy 26 (1999),
33 1-40
151 Ann Rudinow Saetnan, “Scientific? Democratic? Effective? Towards an Evaluation of
Norway’s First Medical Consensus Conference”, Science & Public Policy 29 (2002), 218
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the majority152. Thus, majority-minority status does flot affect in a significant
manner appreciation of the deliberative process. Hence, asking for a mai ority
decision could indeed make the group reach a consensual decision while not
making it an obligatory stance. We can thus conclude that “la règle de majorité est
donc une règle pratique permettant de disposer pacifiquement de conflits d’opinion
qui risqueraient de retarder indéfiniment des décisions nécessaires”153.
We should also clarify that the deliberant assembly will decide what
mai ority thresholds the items on the ballot must obtain for them to be considered
as passed by the electorate. As we will show in the next section, we advocate for
adjustable qualified majorities for each items to be passed. This could seem
contradictory, since we only require absolute majority in the case of the
deliberative process; we would then be asking for one rule to apply in one setting,
while we would ask another rule for another setting.
But it may not be that contradictory. We find it more acceptable to give
increased liberty to the few citizens who will decide on the referendum question
(the ballot), and constrain the actual decision making (the vote), since outcomes
from the vote have consequences for the entire polity, not just for the deliberant
assembly. In addition, the absolute majority we require in the deliberative process
is mainly based on practical considerations (consensus too hard to reach, time
borne considerations...), while the adjustable qualified majority we propose for
152 Morreil, “Citizens’ Evaluations ofParticipatory Democratic Procedures “, 313
Ryan, Les comités, 228
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items to pass is based mainly on normative reasoning (relationship between
majority and minorities in the polity...).
Discussing the ‘deliberative method’
The key to the superiority of our method for ballot construction is that the
final decision on the ballot is in the hands of a citizen body, not in the hands of the
goveming bodies. This goes along with Dryzek’s opening lines: “the deliberative
tum represents a renewed concem with the authenticity of democracy: the degree
to which democratic control is substantive rather than symbolic, and engaged by
competent citizens”1 ‘. This would seem a positive thing since it is reasonable to
think that elected representatives will be influenced by extemal considerations
(such as re-election, or pleasing certain lobby groups) that may sometimes conflict
with political efficiency, while citizens do flot have to worry about such things.
This line of reasoning has been put fonvard by a range of scholars. Amongst them,
Carson and Martin note that
Politicians are well known to make compromises in order to be endorsed and elected, and
to spend a large fraction of their time cultivating favors, fund-raising, campaigning, and public
relations, so they can be elected and reelected’55.
Similarly, Joseph Bessette, in a study on Congressional behaviour, notes
that many informai mies of conduct have deteriorated during the years, and ieft
certain individualistic comportments unconstrained. He conciudes that “less and
less do the members of the House and Senate seem wiiiing to sacrifice their
154 See John S. Dryzek, Deliberative democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 1
Carson and Martin, Random Selection in Decision Making, 101
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private advantage for the sake ofresponsible Iawrnaking”56. Finally, as Bowier et
al. show, citizens themselves believe that they are less corrupted by special
interest than elected officiais in making politicai choices157.
The advantages of our ‘deliberative method’ are numerous. First, it reduces
substantially the govemmental capacity to manipulate and distort the process of
ballot construction. As we have shown in the beginning of this section, the
referendum question is a crucial aspect of a referendum, and too often lias it been
manipulated to serve the interests of the sponsoring body (usually the
government). Our ‘deliberative method’ also encourages more actual and
meaningful citizen participation.
Related is the fact that the recommendations that arise from this public
deliberation are binding for the government, forcing it to present the project that
has been etched out of the citizen& deliberation. 0f course, this could be seen as
problematic, most especially when what citizens arrive at after deliberation does
not match what the government wants to push. An example of this can be seen in
Quebec’s recent “États Généraux”, where a group of citizens had been gathered to
decide which propositions they would like the then goveming Parti Québécois to
submit for public approval. The then minister responsible for electoral reform,
Jean-Pierre Charbonneau, had been pushing hard for adoption of a presidential
system in Quebec. But it was not to be, as 53% percent of the 1000 citizens that
56 See Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voice ofReason: Deliberative Democracy andAmerican
National Government (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994), 149
157 See Bowier, Donovan and Karp, “Popular Attitudes Towards Direct Democracy”, 19-20
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were present at the approval convention voted against the proposition’58. It was
thus with an amputated version of bis project that the minister would have had to
work with had the PQ been re-elected, and had the momentum for electoral
change persisted amongst the population.
One could therefore ask: if citizens were to have the capacity to amputate
govemmental projects, what incentives would the goveming bodies have to
uphold and defend any such projects to the electorate in a referendum campaign?
The answer would be that the govemment have many incentives to push it
through, since it would be in its best electoral interests to do so. If the process is
publicized and gets sufficient media coverage (as we would expect it would), and
the citizens feel that the goveming bodies are giving them more say in public
policy inaking, it could be correctly hypothesized that in retum, citizens will offer
the goveming party sorne electoral advantages, which may not amount to a
guaranteed re-election, but surely higher levels of approval. On the flip-side, if the
govemment did not respect the wiYl of the deliberant, this could be seen as flot
following the will of the people, which is a fundamental prerequisite of liberal
democracy, and this would certainly flot be in its best electoral interests.
A second advantage of the method is that it integrates in a very efficient
manner our central contention that participation breeds education. From Mill to
Tocqueville to others, many philosophers believe that integrating citizens in public
158 See résultats du scrutin, hp://www.pouvoircitoyen.cornIfr/etatsgenraux/guestions.htrn1 (page
consultée le 7 août 2003)
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decision making allows for them to acquire greater political skills, making it easier
to cope with complex issues that affect their lives. Robert Gargarella offers several
ways in which deliberation helps the formation ofbetter, civic-minded citizens:
[Djeliberation may help irnpartiality by forcing people to filter out mere self-interested
arguments...
[T]he process of deliberation, by which people exchange opinions, listen to other’s
arguments, and so on, helps people to improve their capacity to live with others...
[D]eliberation may confribute to irnpartiality by helping each participant to clarify and
purify his or her own position. [...] deliberation may be useful by providing information and
expanding the panorama ofavailable alternatives159.
Ward et al. also present evidence that citizen juries tend to prornote
social leaming, “where the complexity of the world is revealed through inquiry
and interaction, and the sharing of information”60. Boy et al. note that a srnalÏ
group of profanes can, through exchanges of information, and fore knowledge that
their participation will be meaningful, 5e brought to a state of “mini-savants”161.
Empirical evidence lias been presented by some authors. In the deliberative
opinion poli held in England in 1994, fishkin notes some net changes that could
be interpreted as education growths. For example, lie finds that respondents
showed an increased awareness of prisons as limited tools in figliting crime, and
that they displayed an increased sensitivity to the procedural rights of
defendants162.
59 Robert Gargarella, “Full Representation, Deliberation, and Impartiality”, in Ion Elster (ed),
Delibe,ative Deinocracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 261
160 Ward, Norval, Landman and Pretty, “Open Citizens’ Juries and the Politics of Sustainability”,
285
161 Boy, Donnet Kamel and Roqueplo, “Un exemple de démocratie participative”, 789
162 fsshksn, Voice of the People, 178-79.
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But some authors have discounted fishkin’s observations. In a study
analysing participants in the Granada 500 experiment (another deliberative
opinion poil), Denver et al. find that 1) the sample is ofien unrepresentative ofthe
general population (mostly in terms of political interest), and 2) that the
deliberative process is unlikeiy to produce the change that is expected by Fishkin.
They find very littie evidence that 1) participants became more knowledgeable; 2)
that participants developed real opinions as opposed to non-attitudes; and 3) that
participants became more sophisticated, where their opinion was more rationai and
more consistent with other elernents of their belief system163. In parallel, Daniel
Merkie, analysing the National Issues Convention, finds that education leveis have
flot grown, and that the resulting opinions did not differ much from what one
wouÏd usually get from normal polis.
Even afier a massive effort to educate ordinary citizens and motivate them to engage in
deliberation on the issues, the conclusion about aggregate-level opinion from the deliberative poil
were strikingly similar to those one could have gleaned, at a much lower cost, using conventional
polling methods’64.
However, there is more recent evidence that deliberation does indeed breed
education. for example, Fishkin et al. find evidence of educationai growth
following the 1996 Texas utility deliberative poli. Whuie before the deliberative
process only 55% of participants were wiling to pay at ieast a $1 more a month to
encourage environment friendly renewable energy resources, afler the process,
163 See David Denver, Gordon Hands and Bili Jones, ‘Fishkin and the Deliberative Opinion Poil:
Lessons from a Study ofthe Granada 500 Television Program”, Political Communications 12
(1995), 147-156.
164 See Daniel M. Merkle, ‘The National Issues Convention Deliberative Poil”, Public Opinion
Quarterly 60 (1996), 616
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88% ofthe deliberants said they would165. In another piece, this time analysing the
first British deliberative opinion poli, they report that while participants did flot
learn mucli about the political world in general, they came out much more aware
of many aspects of the British legal system. In addition, they found that
educational growth was flot restricted to already well-inforrned deliberants. Thus,
they conclude that Tton average, our participants emerge looking more like ideal
citizens than they did beforehand” 166 Andersen and Jaeger also find educational
growth, this time following the Danish consensus conference on the future of
motoring. In this conference - in which out of the 14 participants, 11 were car
owners — the recommendations that came out of the conference was to gradually
double the price of gasoline to reduce car traffic. This “showed the ability of the
method and the process to lifi [the deliberants] out of the selfish way of thinking
as car owners, and put broader perspectives on the problems of transport and the
environrnent”167.
Others have made the case for educational growth through alternative
channels ofdeliberation. For example, Robert Huckfeldt finds that
Polïtical communication within networks of social relations serves to enhance the
individual and collective capacities of citizens to play meaningful roles in democratic politics...
[Thus] flot only do people exchange biased viewpoints through a process of social interaction, but
they also acquire information and expertis&68.
165 See Luskin, Fishkin and Joweli, ‘Deliberative Polling and Public Consultation’, 663
166 See Robert C. Luskin, James S. fishkin and Roger Joweil, “Considered Opinion: Deliberative
Polling in Britain”, British Journal oJPolitical Science 32 (2002), 484
167 Andersen and Jaeger, ‘Scenario Workshops and Consensus Conferences”, 335
68 Robert Huckfeldt, “The Social Communication ofPolitical Expertise”, American Journal of
Politicat Science 45 (2001), 436-3 8
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Druckman and Nelson find that deliberation can limit elite influence,
where cross-cutting conversation eliminates elite framing effects.
In sum, in the political world where people receive and then discuss elite information,
conversation can limit elite influence
- but only if those conversations involve cross-cutting groups
or individuals exposed to alternative arguments169
Sirnilarly, Diana Mutz finds that cross-cutting exposure increases
acceptance of rationale for dissonant ideas, while, at the same time, increasing
political tolerance170. Thus, this evidence gives us good hope that deliberation
indeed bas an educative function, and fosters an increased acceptance of certain
democratic norms and behaviour.
A third potential advantage of our ballot construction rnethod is that
participation in this process may lead to an alternative comprehension of
democracy’s workings and rationale. This is noted by Nino: “a democratic
government is a public good. As such, it is unfair to enjoy its benefits as a free
riderTTl7. In effect, it would be reasonable to expect that having experienced real
life, meaningful decision making, the citizen (and those close to him) would then
transcend this single experience to other aspects ofpolitical life. Smith and Wales
note that “there is empirical evidence that some jurors [they do not say how many]
are more civically active long after the jury process has ended’172. This may be
James N. Druckman and Kjersten R. Nelson, “framing and Deliberation: How Citizens
Conversations Limit Elite Influence”, American Journal ofPolitical Science 47 (2003), 737
170 See Diana C. Mutz, “Cross-Cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice”,
Ainerican Political Science Review 96 (2002), 111-126
‘ Carlos Santiago Nino, The constitution ofDeliberative Democracy (New Haven: Yale
universitypress, 1996), 154
t72 Graham Srnith and Corinne Wales, ‘Citizens’ Juries and Deliberative Democracy”, 60. See also
S. Mclver, An Evaluation ofthe Kings fund Citizens’Juries Programme, (Birmingham: Health
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due to the increase in civic knowledge they have attained. As Gaiston notes: “Ail
other things being equal, the more knowledge citizens have, the more likely they
are to participate in public matters”173.
It can also be hypothesized that this procedure of deliberation will also
promote participation in the broader public, particularly if there is enough
pubÏicity and media coverage. Fishkin notes that the 1999 deliberative poli in
Australia had a positive effect on the mass public who watched the broadcast174.
This lias also been corroborated by Simon Joss. Analyzing Danish consensus
conferences, lie finds that
The conferences are reported to have contributed to well-ïnforrned and extensive public
debate on scientific and technological issues. Significant proportion of the public seems to how
about the conferences and the topics discussed’75.
A final advantage of our method is the legitimizing factor: referring to the
population a ballot that has been constructed by their peers gives more legitimacy
to the whole referendum and its outcome. Knowing that their peers have
constructed the ballot, it is highly plausible that the population in general will
better accept the referendum process and the resuits. hi this sense, “it makes
political processes more efficient by reducing the costs of enforcing
service management centre, 1997), 5$-9; A. Coote and J. Lenaghan, Citizens’Juries.’Ttheo,y and
Practice (Londond: IPPR, 1997), pp.6S; 89-90
See Williarn A. Gaiston, “Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic Education”,
Animal Review ofPolitical Science 4 (2001), 224. In a way, we are inching toward the creation of
an attentive public as was described by Gabriel A. Almond. See Tite Arnerican Peopte and foreign
Policy (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950)
N James S. Fishkin, “Consulting the Public Through Deliberative Polling’, Journal ofPoÏicy
Analysis andManageinent 22 (2003), 131. However, he does flot mention the nature ofthis effect.
175 Simon Joss, ‘Danish Consensus Conferences as a Model ofParticipatory Teclmology
Assessment: an Impact Study of Consensus Conferences on Danish Parliament and Danish Public
Debate”, Science & Public Policy 25 (1998), 17
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compliance”176. This follows the rationale for Reim et al.’s planning ceils. Social
acceptance of a policy is closely linked with the perception that: 1) the procedure
for making the decision was fair and 2) the public has something valuable to
contribute to policy making177. Similarly, Andersen and Jaeger, discussing
consensus conferences, note that “conferences represent an opportunity for those
with little power to obtain information and to be heard, and tiuts an opportunity for
more democratic decision-making’78.
We should, however, point to a disadvantage with our deliberative method,
namely that of vote trading, or logrolling. Logroling is defined by the Merrian
Webster as “trading of votes by legislators to secure favourable action on projects
of individual interest”; it is thus a mechanism of “you scratch my back, and I will
scratch yours”. Let us clarify that voting in the deliberative setting would be
public. This goes along with the requirement that ail aspects of the deliberative
setting be as open and transparent as possible. However, as noted by Gordon
Tullock, logrolling “occurs when a rather small body of voters vote openly on
each measure; [...] under these circumstances trades of votes are easy to arrange
and observe and significantly affect the outcome”79. In the environment of the
deliberative assembly, especially since we require only for a majority decision and
flot for consensus, it would be reasonable to hypothesize that certain individuals
may have incentives to place certain items on the ballot, and would be ready to
‘ See John Parkinson, “Legitimacy Problems in Deliberative Democracy”, 182
177 See Ortwin Renn, Thomas Webler, Horst Rakel, Peter Dienel and Branden Johnson, “Public
Participation in Decision Making: a Three-Step Procedure”, Poticy Sciences 26(1993), 189-214
178 Andersen and Jaeger, “Scenario Workshops and Consensus Conferences”, 336
‘ Gordon Tullock, “Problems of Majority Voting”, Journal oJPolitical Economy 67 (1959), 571
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secure these items in retum for accepting the placement of items that they do no
feel so strongly about, but about which someone else feels strongly about. This
phenomenon wouid occur in cases where preference on items is unequally
distributed amongst the deliberative assembly’80.
For our part, we recognize and accept the possibility of logrolling, noting
however, that it is common to many rnethods of preference aggregations. The
phenomenon occurs also in government. We couÏd perhaps reduce some form of
logrolling by making the vote secret, but this would go against our desire for
opeimess and transparency in ail steps of the deliberative process. Thus, there does
flot seem much one can do to prevent it. We, however, point to a light ofhope that
is offered by Dryzek and List: logrolling may be too costly in the case of
deliberation.
In deliberation, [...] ïndividuals have to justify their preferences in terms acceptable to
others. [...] While this individual may stili misrepresent this intensity, [...], lying about one’s
preferences is potentially costly in deliberationh8L.
Conclusion
We reviewed the two methods that were used in Jackson and in British
Columbia. Having demonstrated that the referendum question has a noted impact
on voting intentions and outcomes, we showed that the above two methods made
80 See Joe Oppenheimer, “Some Potitical Implication of “Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: a
ProofofLogical Evidence:” a Comment”, American Political Science Review 69 (1975), 963-966;
Swartz, for bis part, does consider one advantage of vote trading, namely, even if vote trading does
lead, sometirnes, to non-Pareto type outcomes,faiture to trade votes can also. See “Collective
Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading”, American Political Science Review 71 (1977),
999-1010
181 See John Dryzek and Christian List, “Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: a
Reconciliation”, British Journal ofPoÏitical Science 33 (2003), 20
69
it too easy for the goveming bodies to manipulate the referendum question to
influence resuits in a manner that best fits their interest.
We then proceeded to propose our own method of ballot construction,
which we named the ‘deliberative method’. It takes a group of randomly selected
citizens, brings them in a common Ïiett, and has them deliberate amongst
themselves on a project the government wishes to pass into law. The deliberants
decision is final and binding for the government. The decision is taken by majority
voting. It was shown to be our preferred method, enabling less possibility of
manipulation on the part of elected officiais, and giving more place for actual
citizen participation. In addition, it had an educative function, and injected more
legitimacy into the whole process. However, we noted that this method was
susceptible to iogrolling, a defect common to other altemate methods.
Chapter 3
How about a threshold...
In dernocratic systems, majority requirements in referenda vary greatly,
with particular politicai traditions requiring more or less constraint on group
decisions. Some countries like Canada use the mie of absolute majority’82: the
option that gets more than 50% of the votes is the victor. Other countries prefer to
use the mie of a qualified majority. In this case, the threshoid requires for the
majority to be higher than simply ‘more than 50%’. for example, the constitution
of the tiny isiands of St-Kitts-and-Nevis allows for the island of Nevis to separate
from St-Kitts if “[T]he bili has been approved on a referendum heid in the island
of Nevis by flot iess than two-thirds of ail voters validiy cast in that
referendum”83. The pope’s eiection is also subject to a qualified majority vote,
where a two-third majority of the Coliege of Cardinais must agree on the new
pope’ ‘.
The argument usualiy made in favour of absolute majority is that it is just
and equitable: ail have equai voice, and the mie by majority is respected.
However, it can be criticized on the grounds that it gives too much weight to
majority groups, and this can be detrimental to minorities in the polity. On the
182 We accept Rae’s distinction between ‘50% + 1’ and ‘more than 50%’. The former applies where
there is an even number ofelectorate; the latter when the electorate is an uneven number. See
Douglas W. Rae, The PoliticaÏ Consequences offlectorat Laws (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1967), 23. However, as is noted by Pierre favre, ‘more than 50%’ applies to both cases. We
therefore will use ‘more than 50%’ in the context of this paper. Sec Pierre Favre, La décision de
majorité, 159
‘ See article 113, no.2 (atinea b) ofSt-Kitts-and-Nevis’s constitution
“ See http://www.catholic-pmzes.com!pope!election.asp. (page consultée le 27 septembre 2003)
New rules introduced by Pope Joim-Paul II calls for an absolute majority vote if, after multiple
rounds ofballoting, the choice on the new pope has flot been finalized.
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other hand, the argument generally made for qualified mai orities is that they are
more legitimate, since the voice of minorities is better protected. However, it is
often accused ofbeing biased against change. Thus, the debate between both types
ofrnajority can be seen as one between equity and legitimacy.
The debate also revoïves around deciding how to calculate these
majorities. From what denominator should these thresholds be calculated? One
approach involves calculating the threshold in relation to the whole eligible
electorate. Another approach involves calculating majorities in regard to ah votes
cast, whereas a final method involves calculating the threshold based on valid
votes onÏy. These last two methods calculate majorities taking to account actual
participation and political expression oniy.
This section analyses and discusses these different methods. We confront
advantages and disadvantages of each rnethod in respect to the checklist ballot,
and we show how the ballot’s outcomes are affected by different majority
calculations. It wihl be argued that the threshold requirement should be that of a
quahified majority; however, this qualified majority threshold should be adjustable,
depending on the decision to be taken. Because some decisions have more impact
than others, the majority requirements should be able to take into account the
possible impact of these decisions. In regard to the calculation of the qualified
majority, it will be argued that the calculus should be made based on votes cast,
whether vahid or flot. This method ensures four things: that the will ofthe people is
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properly expressed; that the outcomes reftect the political expression ofthose who
voted; that these outcomes are flot burdened by tactics of abstention that can
plague other methods ofmajority calculation; and finally, that the requirements for
an item to pass are not unjustly Ïow. In addition, it ensures that minorities have a
proper say in the collective decision-making. In the previous section we advocated
the ‘deliberative methodT in constructing the ballot because of its participatory and
thus educative function. Our proposition for the qualified majority is based on
another important aspect ofthe checklist ballot: the legitimizing factor.
What mai ority for the checklist ballot?
In Jackson, Mississippi and in British Columbia, the majority requirements
were different. While in B.C. the requirement for each item to pass was ‘more than
50%’, in Jackson, because of the legislative constraints set by the legislature in the
1950s, the requirement for a spending to pass was 60%. In the B.C. referendum,
alI eight items were ‘accepted’, though only 39% of the eligible electorate
submitted their mail-in ballot on time. In Jackson, only three spending items out of
ten made the 60% threshoÏd. This illustrates how placing different majority
thresholds can affect outcomes.
Let us first tum our attention to the absolute majority threshold, where
items are passed if they obtain ‘more than 50%’. At first glance, this method seems
to be well adapted to the checklist ballot. As we have stated earlier, one clear
advantage of absolute majority is that it is equitable: it gives everyone equal voice,
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since “réclamer davantage que la majorité absolue, c’est faire prévaloir la volonté
minoritaire du peuple sur sa volonté majoritaire”185. In addition, it is a
compreliensive rnethod for the electorate: most electors have been accustomed to
political decisions being decided at absolute majority. “Le principe de majorité est
un dogme. [...] C’est le système le plus simple, le plus primitif, si l’on ose dire, où
la force du nombre sert le pouvoir”86. For Robert Maclver, absolute majority is a
social necessity. Requiring unanimity is far too complicated and renders many
decisions far too tenuous in respect to the proper working of decision making.
Hence, lie suggests that “decision by majority is in matters of policy a practical
necessity”87. Thus, as Norman J. Schofield notes,
Majority mie is left residually as the only permissible procedure for choosing collective
policies, since it alone gives no a priori advantage to either specific set of individuals or to sets of
individuals who happen to seek retention ofthe status quo188.
However, in some cases, absolute mai ority can actually be detrimental. For
example, in the case of the Jackson checklist ballot, only 3 items passed the
required 60% rule, totalling 35,2 M$. However, had the bar been set at ‘more than
5 0%’, it would have been 8 items that would have passed, which would have
185 Richard Gervais, “Référendum et majorité qualifiée”, La Presse (Montréal), 18 septembre
1998. This text places itself in a long series of debates surrounding what good majority should be
used in a potential third referendum on sovereignty in Quebec following the adoption, by the
federal government, of Bili C-20, following a Supreme Courts decisïon requiring that sovereignty
be approved by a ‘clear majority’.
186 Ciaude Leclercq, Le principe de majorité (Paris: Armand Colin, 1971), 51. A similar argument
is made by Georg Simmel. For Simmel, the might ofthe majority is a metaphysical, theoretical
might that replaces the physical might that would otherwise be in effect. “Procedure (voting)
replaces force and ballots replace bullets”. Quoted in Elaine Spitz, MajoriG’ Ride (Chatam: Chatam
House Publisher, 1984), 156
87 See Robert M. Maclver, Commtinity (London: Macmillan, 1928), 140 quoted in Elaine Spitz,
Majoritv Ride, 163
l88 Norman J. Schofield, “Is Majority Rule Special?”, in Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F.
Weisberg (eds), Probability Models of Collective Decision Making (Columbus: Charles E. Menill
publishing company, 1972), 62
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totalled an additional 36,1M$ in spending189. Iii sucli a case, the white population
might have clinched their fists a lot more than with the original outcome,
considering the racial tension that was prevalent in the city, and the historical
difficulties with which the referendum organizers had to go through.
Thus, the absolute majority requirement does flot seem best for the
checklist ballot. Even if it does give equal chance to elements of change as to
elements of the status quo, it does not seem to be the most legitimate threshold,
since it does not give enough protections to minorities and their political
preferences. Legitimacy does flot simply entail giving equal chance to ail; it also
mcans ensuring that all in the society are protected from haphazard decisions. It is
not always legitimate to make the will of the majority prevail, since, as Dahi puts
it:
By making ‘most preferred’ equivalent to ‘preferred by most” we deliberately bypass a
crucial problem: What if the minority prefers ïts alternative more passionately than the majority
prefers a contrary alternative? Does the majority principle stili make sense?’9°
Absolute majority has become, through the years, the only talk of
government, where decisions that are reached by this tbreshold are automatically
considered to be the true expression of the people; in the words of Adhémar
Eismen: “la majorité est une de ces idées simples qui se font accepter d’emblée”191.
In reality, however, absolute majority makes only a small place for different
189 See Glaser, ‘White Voters, Black Schools”, 37
190 Robert A. Dahi, A Preface to Democratic Theoiy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1956), 90
191 Quoted in Louis Massicotte, “La notion de majorité”, Bttlletin de la bibliothèque de l’Assemblée
Nationale 14 (1984), 21
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intensities of preferences. It does allow for different intensities to be expressed
when we permit logrolling; however, Jogrolling is a practice constrained mainly
within the walls of legislatures, and it would seem difficuit, therefore, to assume
that there wiÏl be much logrolling in large electorates.
It should be clearly stated, however, that protecting minorities is a double
edged sword. In our above example, the requirement of a 60% threshold could
lead one to conclude that this rule allowed the white population to oppress the
black minority by sheer strength of number; but it could also be seen as a tool of
compromise between the demands of the minority and those of the majority. In
this case, with the threshold set at 60%, the truly needed and urgent needs would
be voted in, while the more frivolous would be excluded, leaving the minority
satisfied with its gains, and the majority satisfied not to have lost too much,
avoiding the backlash of an increase in racial tensions in the city. In this sense, a
tool that could be viewed as denigrating may, if viewed in a different angle,
actually be seen as enabling a certain form of social equilibrium. It would then,
while losing some form of legitimacy on the representational side, actually gain
legitimacy on another front, that of social equilibritim and social order. Follows
then, in the case of the checklist ballot, that we find it necessary to go beyond
usual standards of majority, because the use of the checklist ballot is meant as a
tool for improving democracy, and as a means of giving greater Iegitimacy to the
process and to the outcomes.
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Having rejected an absolute majority threshoM, we are left with the
qualified majority principle. The usual justification for it is well put by Favre: “La
justification qu’il est communément donné à une telle exigence de majorité est
qu’elle oblige à un consentement proche de l’unanimité”92. However, it must be
acknowledged that such a majority is biased against change: “[Q]ualified
majorites, by blocking change, protect the status quo and prevent society from
adjusting to new conditions”93. hi effect, it is a restrictive decision procedure
which “gives special authority to individuals who happen to be nay-sayers”94.
Thus, criticism around this method usually stems from people who feel that no
special set of preference should be allowed to have an advantage over others:
instead of tyranny of the majority, the criticism is that there could be tyranny of a
minority.
This being said most agree that certain decisions must be constrained by a
wider sign of approval. The case of constitutional changes is a good example: in
the U.S., for example, 38 states out of 50 must ratify proposed constitutional
amendments for them to become national laws. This ensures that when an
amendment passes this level of approval, the states that voted against the
amendment are flot in any position of majority. Thus, if the argument in choosing
a type of majority for a decision would be to have the maximum consensus, the
logical choice would be the qualified majority, since, as is noted by McClosky,
consensus (in regard with shared ideals for an optimal community) can only be
192 Pierre Favre, La decision de majorité, 132
Elaine Spitz, Majority Ride, 173
Norman J Schofield, ‘Is Majority Rule Special?”, 61
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attainable at the 75% level, midway between bare (absolute) majority and
unanimity1.
Pertaining to the checklist ballot, it has been postulated throughout this
thesis that the division of a global project into separate parts would make the
choices clearer and more comprehensible for the electorate. In addition, it would
also enable more electoral choices for the voters. Thus, while on a global
referendum package, finding a qualified majority to accept the package can be
arduous, in the case of separate issues, requiring a qualified rnajority does flot
seem that unreasonable (for unrealistic), since the package is broken down into
parts, and thus, each part has a better chance of obtaining larger rates of approval
than if they were integrated to a single package. In addition, as noted by Kadane:
The submission of revision in a single package allows the vehement opponents of each
article to unite, frequently defeating the package. Submission in separate questions, however,
divides the opposition and leads to passage’96.
He shows that in state constitutional amendrnents, projects that were
submitted to the population as a whole were rejected, while projects presented in
parts were passed nearly entirely. Dryzek gives a good example of this possibility
in relation to the peace process in Northem freland.
If confined to the single dimension of sovereignty, the issue is intractable, with effective
majorities of key actors against every conceivable alternative. But once dimensions are introduced
— such as amnesty for politically motivated crimes, civil rights, cross-border bodies, electoral
systems or guaranteed representation for particular groups
— an effective super-majority for a
seUlement could be constituted’97.
195 Hebert McClosky, “Consensus and Ideology in American Politics”, 363
Joseph B. Kadane, “On Division ofthe Question”, Public Choice 13 (1972), 47
Dryzek and List, “Social Choice Theoiy and Deliberative Democracy”, 19
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In our case, since the votes can be multiple, providing electors the choice
of agreeing to some powers while refusing others, we should seek the assent of
more than halfthe electorate. As is properly stated by Johnston et aï.
Rule by simple majority presupposes underlying socio-political unity. [...J Non
majoritarian decision mies reflect the moral diversity of the polity, the fact that it comprises more
than mie proto-nation or more than one moral community198.
In effect, this brings us back to the whole debate conceming the weight of
minority positions in the polity if we used qualified majorities. For example, if a
threshold was set at 60% for an item to pass, one possible interpretation of this
would be that if 41% did flot select this item, the item would flot pass; hence, the
desire of the minority would have prevailed. This is one interpretation. Another
possible interpretation, that we prefer, is that the majority was not able to show
and justify to the minority that the item in question was as good for them as it was
for the majority. ‘Consensus’ in this case, was not able to be formed on this
question. And it seems imperative that decisions should be reached with the
maximum consensus possible, where both majorities and minorities feel secure in
regard to the outcomes stemming from usage of our checklist ballot. Thus, if the
majority can convince the minority of the justness of its proposition, the minority,
we believe, will follow. Claude Leclercq puts it best when lie says:
Une majorité des deux tiers ou des trois cinquièmes signifie seulement que les décisions
adoptées à ce niveau auront d’autant plus de chances de respecter les choix de la minorité. [...] La
majorité renforcée veut signifier donc que la présomption de qualité est du côté du nombre et
Johnston, Blais, Giddengil and Nevitte, The Challenge ofDirect Democracy, 252
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quune décision prise à la majorité des deux tiers a plus de chances de combler les voeux du couple
majorité-minorité, donc de l’ensemble des é’9
Let us remind the reader, as we have stated in the beginning of this section,
that while we advocate the use of a qualified majority for items to be passed in the
case of the checklist ballot, this threshold should be adjustable, depending on the
gravity and the weight of the consequences for the polity. Some decisions may
require less of a restrictive threshold, some more. For example, a referendum on
the renaming of streets in St-Adèle-de-la-belle-rivière does not have the same
consequences for the polity as one pertaining to a referendum on issues
conceming the creation of a ftee trade zone in south East Asia. Thus, “la majorité
se défend d’être statique, [...] elle se veut en expansion ou en récession selon les
décisions à prendre”200. However, the decision of what the exact threshold of
majority should be is flot for us to decide in the course of this thesis. As we have
stated earlier in the section on ballot construction, we propose that the threshold be
decided by the deliberative assembly, at the time of deliberation.
What about the denominator?
Having said this, another debate springs up: from what denominator shah
we calculate these adjustable qualified majorities? This is a crucial question since
it lias ofien times produced dramatic results. Two notable examples can be cited as
evidence. In 1979, electors in Scotiand were bracing themselves for an important
Claude Leclercq, Le principe de majorité, 101-102. Ryan, quoting Lord Acton, abounds in the
same direction: “La qualité d’une démocratie [...] ne se mesure pas d’abord au sort qu’elle fait à sa
majorité [...], mais au sort qu’elle fait à sa minorité”. See Les comités, 228
200 Claude Leclercq, Le principe de majorité, 101
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referendum on devolution. Amongst those who voted, 51,6% favoured the project
while 48,5% rejected it; in regard to the total electorate, this meant that 32,85%
approved while 30,78% rejected the project201. However, the law required that if
approval for the project did not reach 40% of the total electorate, Parliarnent
should pass a law cancelling devolution, which it did. Hence, even if a majority of
those who had voted expressed approval for the project, it was rejected because it
did flot gamer enough support in regard to the entire electorate. Similarly, in 1939
Denmark, a referendum was held on propositions by the government to abolish the
second chamber and introduce the possibility of legislative referenda. Out of those
who went to vote, 9 1,9% agreed with the project. However, the rule was that those
in favour must comprise 45% of the electorate: these 9 1,9% only represented
44,46% of the total electorate. The proposition was hence rejected by the
legislature202. The same phenomenon has also plagued candidate elections, as
exempïified by the recent Serbian eÏections of 2002, when it took three attempts
for the chosen candidate to garner support representing more than 50% of the total
electorate.
Indeed, many different caictilation methods are used around the world. In
Ireland, for example, for ail referenda other than those dealing with constitutional
reforms, if an absolute majority ofthe valid votes, representing 33.3.% of the total
201 See Vemon Bogdanor, “The 40 Percent Rule’, Parliamentaiy Affairs 33 (1980), 257
202 See Louis Massicotte, “La réforme de la procédure référendaire: réflexions sur quelques
enjeux, in Collectif, Démocratie et reférendum, 135. It should be noted that the proposition was
again presented to the electorate in 1953 and this time, the project was passed by the legislature,
those favouring the project representing 45,76% ofthe total electorate.
electorate, votes against the project, it fails; if flot, the project is accepted203. This
means that a project submitted to popular referendum can only fail if it is voted
down by ‘more than haif the voters’, representing 1/3 ofthe total electorate. On the
contrary, in Uruguay, on ail projects concerning constitutional reforms, if an
absolute majority of valid votes, representing 35% of the total electorate, votes in
favour of a project, it passes; if not, the project is rejected204.
In Quebec, during the numerous debates conceming Bu! C-20 (the Clarity
Biil), some authors defended the proposition that the absolute majority required
for further referenda on Quebec sovereignty be calculated based on the total
electorate. The argument was made that ‘a majority of votes cast, if it does not
amount to a majority of electors, is really a plurality and not a majority at ail”205.
However, this argument is faulted on two points, for one thing, it would be
unreasonable (idealistic?) to expect a 100% tumout. Brams et al. note that
abstention is frequent in referenda. For example, in a referendum held in
Califomia in 1990, 11.8% of Los Angeles electors abstained206. hi addition, voter
tumout is a function of the type of referendum. Thus, voter tumout is higher in
binding rather than advisory referenda, and in tiglit-race referenda rather than less
close referenda207. Hence, calculating a majority as a function of the total
electorate places a higher burden on those voters wishing to approve the project
203 See Ireland’s constitution, chapter 15, article 47, no.2.1
204 See Uruguay’s constitution, article 331 (alinea b)
205 Julius Grey, “A Convincing Majority’, Tue Gazette (Montréal), September 5 1998.
206 Steven J Brams, D. Marc Kilgour and William S. Zwicker, “Voting on Referenda: the
Separability Problem and Possible Solutions”, Electoral Studies 16 (1997), 359-377
207 Morten Soberg and Thomas P. Tangeras, ‘Voter Turnout in Direct Democracy: Theory and
Evidence”, Working paper no. 596, lUI, The Research Institute oflndustrial Economics, 2001
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than on those wishing to reject it. Louis Massicotte explains that if such a method
had been used in the 1995 referendum, considering the alrnost 94% tumout, the
Yes option would have needed 54,5% of the votes to pass208. A second objection
concems the fact that with such a method, the people wishing to reject the
proposition may abstain from voting, thus giving undue support to the NO side,
which will resuit in a loss of legitimacy for the process. h addition, invalid votes
(such as blank votes) wiil be calculated as votes against the proposition, when in
fact, we cannot say for sure that the intention of these voters was to go against the
project209. This method of calculation should hence be rejected in the case of the
checkiist ballot. Our goal of accrued legitimacy is flot met by such a calculation
method.
Another technique of calculating majorities is in regard to valid votes. This
method ensures that the caiculation rnethod takes into account ail votes deerned
valid by electoral laws. Unfortunately, it does not take into consideration ail
participation by people, since sorne people may have corne to vote but, by choice
or by error, their vote was flot deemed valid in the eyes of electoral laws.
Therefore, these electors’ participation is taken as invalid by electoral agents, and
does not count in the calculation of the final resuit. In effect, this method could be
prone to distortion by electoral laws and manipulation by vested interests,
208 Michel Venne, “Un professeur propose 50%+1
... des électeurs inscrits”, Le Devoir (Québec),
September9 199$.
209 See James Mauldin, “Negative-Option Voting”, The Gazette (Montréal), September 12 1998;
Julius Grey, “A Convincing Majority”; Louis Massicotte, “La notion de majorité”, 30
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especialiy in highly controversial situations210. Thus, this method of calculation
should also be rejected in the case of the checklist ballot.
This leaves us with a final calculation option; that of calculating the
threshold based on votes cast. This method seems the most advantageous. On the
one hand, it calculates votes in terms of actual participation. If electors do flot feel
the need or the want to vote, must the resuit of the referendum realiy take them
into account? If they do flot feel the need to express their views, by voting on
political questions that affect them, then it is our contention that the voting resuit
should not be affected by them. Additionally, the method allows for ail votes cast
to have an impact on the resuit. In this sense, invalid votes are calculated in the
final result, aibeit as statistics, but they are flot taken to be No votes, since their
intention cannot be known211. In this sense, the intention of the elector casting an
invaiid vote is not misrepresented by electoral agents in favour of one option
rather than the other. Thus, this method calculates a wider range of electorai
expressions. Accepting these votes (or ‘non-votes’) is accepting the fact that some
people either feit the need to express their frustration at what is offered to them on
210 In the aftermath ofthe 1995 referendum defeat in Quebec, number ofpeople questioned bias in
vote counting on the part of election officiais, and the question became an item of debate between
Quebec scholars. See Andrew Orkin, Janusz Kaczorowski et Maurice Pinard, ‘Plus de bulletins
rejetés là où le vote pour le NON était fort’, La Presse (Montréal), 11 avril 1996; Edouard Cloutier
et Piene Drouilly, ‘Les allégations de fraude au référendum de 1995: la fausse science ati service
de la vrai politique”, La Presse (Montréal), 2 mai 1996. A study commissioned by the chief
electoral officer of Quebec found that there had indeed been some fraudulent acts committed by
electoral scmtators, which may have changed the actual number ofrejected ballots. The report
recommended the adoption ofthe Belgian type ballot, where a circle was to be filled completely.
See Québec. Directeur general des election. 1996. Bulletins rejetés
- Marche pour l’unité t rapport
du Directeur général des élections t reférendiun du 30 octobre 1995. Québec. Directeur général
des élections
211 The International institute for democratic and electoral assistance (IDEA) shows that for
Canada, invalid votes have not represented more than 3% (1972), and generally represent only
about 1%. See http://www.idea.int (page consultée le 27 septembre 2003)
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the ballot — by casting a protest vote- or that they did flot express themselves in the
proper way, according to parameters set at the institutional level. Whule we cannot
determine with certitude that such invalid votes were protest votes or not, since the
people who cast them at least showed the will to participate in the whole
operation, their expression should be counted in the final result, unlike the non-
participation of those who abstained.
Conclusion
In this section we discussed two things: firstly, what kind of majority
should be required for the items to be declared to have achieved sufficient support
from the electorate to pass into law. Our second discussion was focussed around
different modalities to calculate these majorities.
We started by discussing the absolute majority. Though this method gives
an equal say to elements of change as to elements ofthe status quo, it was rejected
on the grounds that it does flot allow for a sufficient amount of consensus amongst
different groups in the polity. This rejection was based on our contention that the
checklist ballot is an instrument that should strive to make resuits more legitimate
and more consensual. We then tumed our attention to the qualified majority. It
was posited that this method has a bias against the ‘winds of change’. However,
this was our prefen-ed rnethod since it allows for better possibilities of consensus,
and gave a more reasonable importance to minorities. We postulated that by
dividing the project into separate parts, and allowing the citizens to vote separately
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on ail issues, a qualified majority seems very accessible for individual items to
pass the threshold. While we accepted this method as the one best suited for usage
of the checklist ballot, we noted that this qualified majority should be adjustable,
in the sense that different thresholds should be used depending on the gravity and
the weight ofthe decision to be decided by checklist ballot.
A second discussion was centered on different calculation methods of
ascertaining the majority. One method we presented was to calculate majorities
based on the total electorate. This rnethod was rejected since it piaced a larger
burden on those approving the project to taliy up support for their option, which
the qualified majority aiready did. In effect, this method counted abstentions,
blank votes and invalid votes in the rejection category, making electoral
participation a key feature in the outcome. A second method we presented was to
caiculate majorities with respect to valid votes. Ibis method was also rejected
since it did flot give voice to ail electoral participation, as only those votes deemed
valid by electoral agents would be counted, denying “invalid votes” to be counted
in the final resuit. This left us with a final method: calculating the majority based
on votes cast. This seemed the method best suited for the checklist ballot since it
calculates majorities in regard to actual political participation. lii addition, this
method allows for aIl votes cast (invalid or not) to have a true impact on the final
resuit, in the sense that it did flot misrepresent the eiector’s intention in casting an
invalid vote. It also denies the possible influence of free-riding abstentionists on
outcomes.
Chapter 4
Advantages and possible disadvantages
Having positioned ourselves on the debate surrounding representative vs.
direct democracy; having proposed a deliberative way in which the ballot may be
constmcted; and having proposed qualified majority threshold for items to pass,
we are now in a position to present more specifically the advantages and
disadvantages of our checklist ballot, following the way we have proposed to
construct and use it. Two clear advantages are presented here: first, this ballot
gives more options to the elector and makes it easier for the elector to show more
nuanced preferences; second, this ballot offers better possibilities for the electo?s
choice to be competent, and made with the best available information at hand. We
then identify certain possible disadvantages that the ballot could present, and
answer these concerns. The disadvantages that wilI be discussed concern the
possibility of positional effects, of conditional preferences, and of coherence in
ballot outcomes.
Advantages of the checklist ballot
The first advantage is that the checklist ballot offers more options for the
elector than other types of ballot. Since the referendum does not consist of one
hard-wired package, but rather a broken down version, where each issue is
presented and voted on individually, this offers more options, more ways for the
elector to signal his preferences. In addition, as the elector using the checklist
ballot does flot have to cast onïy one vote, but can choose to cast as many votes as
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there are options on the ballot, this further enhances his voting options. Unlike
approval voting, there is flot the rigidity of having to decide only one winner212.
Hence, while the elector has more options presented to him on the ballot, the
elector also has many more possible outcomes (wiimers) out ofhis choices213. This
allows voters to show more nuanced preferences for individual parts of a project,
thereby signifying more clearly their views on the variety of issues presented to
them. In this sense, the checklist ballot allows for the elector flot to have to reject a
project in its entirety on the basis of a certain element that she dislikes strongly,
and it allows the elector the possibility of flot having to accept a project on the
whole simply because she strongly supports certain aspects of it. It thus alleviates
the dilemma that many voters are ofien faced with in referendum voting:
L’on soumet au vote du peuple une loi toute entière, un bloc indivisible, que dans ces
conditions le vote n’est plus libre, le votant étant souvent pris dans cette alternative ou de repousser
une loi qu’il croit bome dans son principe, à raison de telle disposition qu’il juge inadmissible, ou
d’admettre cependant cette disposition pour ne pas repousser la loi toute entière214.
It is also our contention that dividing the question into sub-parts will allow
for a better success rate of packages submitted to the public. For example, in some
cases, certain contingent issues bring down a whole project, whence in reality the
project would be approved, had these issues flot been tied up together in the
212 In my correspondence with Hannu Nurmi and Steven J. Brams, both point to the possibility of
using AV to elect multiple winners, though it does not seem to be their preferred choice. See also
Richard F. Potthoffand Steven J. Brams, “Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options”,
Journal of Theoreticat Politics 10 (1998), 147-78
213 However, as in the case of approval voting, even “if it is perfectly legitimate to [vote for] only
one candidate [...] if all electors vote this way the system loses its distinctive properties”. $ee
Steven J Brams and Jack H. Nagel, “Approval Voting in Practice’, Public Choice 71(1991), 7
214 Quoted in Claude Leclercq, Le principe de majorité, 50
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project. hi such cases, Albert Strum finds that “success is more Ïikely if highly
controversial issues are submitted separately”215.
The second advantage is that the checklist ballot offers better possibilities
for the elector’s choice to be more competent, as defined by Lupia and Johnston:
“A voter’s choice is competent if it is the same choice that she would make given
the most accurate available information about its consequence”216. One could be
tempted to assume that the checklist ballot could make it harder for some people
to vote, in the sense that its format could make it more complicated for people of
lower political knowledge and capacity to properly express their preferences. By
transforming the usual binary acceptance of a project in its entirety to a binary
acceptance of individual parts of the project, the cost of voting itself could be
higher, especially for lesser informed publics, because of the increase in
information gathering that would be needed to comprehend, even in a minimal
fashion, all the issues on the ballot, and by the increase in the number of votes the
elector must cast. This would mean an increase in information costs, which, in the
theory ofrational choice, would lower incentives for the elector to go and vote217.
However, in reality, the checklist ballot does not make it harder to vote,
and it appears reasonable to think that the checklist can improve voter
competence. first, by dividing the project submitted to referendum into a series of
215 Quoted in Joseph 3. Kadane, “On Division ofthe Question”, 47
216 Arthur Lupia and Ricliard Johnston, “Are Voters to Blame? Voter Competence and Elite
Manoeuvres in Referendums” in Mafthew Mendelsohn and Andrew Parkin (eds), Referendum
Democracy: Citizens, Lutes, and Detiberation in Referendum Campaigns (Hampshire: Paigrave,
2001)
2!? See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theoiy ofDemocracy ( New York: Harper, 1957)
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diverse propositions, the elector is given more information about what lie is truly
voting for or against, a point that is noted by Vincent Lemieux: “une question à
deux ou plus d’options est plus riche en information, et elle permet de formuler en
clair chacune des options opposées, au lieu d’en formuler une seule et supposer
que l’option des opposants se réduit à la négative”218. In addition, it is reasonable
to assume that the debates surrounding the referendum will be more focused on
the individual parts of the project. This combination would allow the elector to
have more precise and detailed information on the implications of each issue for
which he must vote on. In this light, the outcomes could be drastically different
from those that would arise from submitting a global project, and more
representative of the electorate’s tme preferences. Furthermore, the use in
cognitive mobilization, as postulated by Dalton, means, “that more citizens now
have the political resources and skills necessary to deal with the complexities of
politics and make their own political decisions”219. We thus conclude that the
elector can be assumed to be in a better position to make an enlightened choice
when using the checklist ballot. Given these facts, the checklist ballot represents,
in our eyes, the fairest voting procedure, as defined by Dunnett: “the rnost
important criterion for a voting procedure is that it be fair (italic in text); and a
voting procedure is fair if it reflects as accurately as possible the preferences of
voters”220.
218 See Vincent Lemieux, “La formulation de la question”, 97
219 Russeil J. Dalton, Citizen Politics in Western Democracies $ Public Opinion and Political
Parties in the United States, Great Britain, West Gernzany, and France (Chatam: Chatam House
Publishers, 1988), 21
220 Michael Dunnett, Voting Procedures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) 29
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A cornplementary method for helping voter competence in the case of the
checklist ballot wouid be to send voter information pamphlets as part of the
referendum campaign. As is noted by Thomas Cronin, “a cleariy presented officiai
information pamphlet is essential to enable voters to make wise policy choices221.
This pamphlet would contain detailed information on each issue, arguments for
and against each presented by the government, and also comments by major
groups concerned with particular issues (unions, big business and so forth). This
wouid provide additionai information to the electors about who supports what and
why.
Possible disadvantages ofthe checklist ballot
A first disadvantage of this ballot format is that it could fail victim to
positional effects. Bain and Hecock, in their study on primary and non-partisan
elections in several Michigan cities, find that candidates placed in certain places
on the ballots have more chances of getting elected222. Their research thus
indicates that particular placement on the ballot generate positional effects. This
point is also made by Delbert Taebel, who, in an experimental research, finds that
??candidates who were listed first on the ballot received a higher percentage of
votes than when they were listed last”223. This corresponds to what Miller and
221 Thomas Cronin, Direct Democracy, 238
222 Henry M. Bain Jr. and Donald S. Hecock, Ballot Position and Voter choice: the
Arrangements on (lie Ballot and it’s Effect on the Voter (Detroit: Wayne State University Press,
1957). This study is the first that examined in details the effect of ballot position on electoral
outcomes.
223 Delbert A. Taebel, ‘The Effect of Ballot Position on Electoral Success”, American Journal of
Political Science 19 (1975), 523.
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Krosnick cail ‘prirnacy effects’; effects that tend to bias choice towards selecting
the first object considered on a set224.
In a related study, Byrne and Pueschel, examining what cues voters tum to
in deciding their electoral choice, find that certain positions on a ballot can give
some advantage. However, while the other studies mentioned earlier concluded
that the first position was universally favoured, Byrne and Pueschel’s study reveals
that first place is not necessarily the most favourable. “First—place-on-the-ballot
candidates receive just the number of votes we would expect them to receive by
chance”225. Rather, they find that the last place on the ballot gives a candidate an
increased advantage, while other positions (like third or fourth) are more
disadvantageous. They explain their divergence from other studies by postulating
that these latter have not differentiated positional effects and incumbency, and that
since incumbents are generally placed first on the ballot, the positional advantage
found in certain studies may instead be due to incurnbency rather than positional
placement on the ballot.
As a matter of fact, a growing body of research discounts the notion of
positional effects. Darcy and McAllister, in a study on ballot position effects,
conclude that:
Much of the literature is methodologically flawed, fails to take into account competing
explanations for the effects which are found, or presents evidence from case studies that have littie
224 See Joanne M. Miller and Jon A. Krosnick, ‘The Impact of Candidate Name Order on Election
Outcomes”, Public Opinion Quarterly 62 (199$), 291-330
225 Gary C. Byrne and J. Kristian Pueschel, “But Who Should I Vote For For County Coroner?”,
Journal ofPoÏitics 36 (1974), 781
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in common. [...] Position effects will manifest itself in situations where voters have no other guide
to a vote choice and must make use ofthe linuted information contained on the ballot itself226.
As exampies ofmethodoiogical flaws, they point to the failure of Bain and
Hecock’s study to include incumbency effects as a possible alternative expianation
to their conclusions. They aiso discount Taebel’s conclusion of positional
advantage, since her experiment does flot approximate voting conditions either in
North America or in Europe. They thus conclude that” when party information is
present on the ballot, there is no positional effect227”. In a reiated study of an
election to the New Hampshire House of Representatives, Darcy shows that voters
do flot pick first place as first choice, but rather other positions228. In effect, he
finds that particular electorai mies or circumstances create the observed advantage
This conclusion is similar to the one reached by Kelley and McAiiister, in an
article discussing the effects of different candidate information present on ballots
in Australia and Britain, in which they conclude that political party selection
procedures (often induced by the popular belief that there are certain advantages
from ballot position) create the illusion ofpositional effects229.
Ail in alt, then, the empirical evidence is quite reassuring. As Darcy shows,
when party information is present there should be no position effects230. No doubt
that in a referendum, electors xviii link their preferred parties to specific issues on
the ballot. Hence, partisan information wili be present even if not directiy on the
226 R. Darcy and lan McAllister, “Ballot Position Effects”, Electoral Studies 9 (1990), 5;14
227 Ibid., 13
22$ R. Darcy, “Positions Effects in Multimember Districts: the New Hampshire House of
Representatives, 1972-1994”, PoÏity 30 (1998), 691-703
229 Jonathan Kelley and Tan McAllister, “Ballot Paper Cues and the Vote in Australia and Britain:
Alphabetic Voting, Sex, and Titie”, Pttblic Opinion Quarterly 48 (1984) 452-466
3O
- Darcy and McAllister, “Ballot Position Effects”
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ballot231. Second, as Miller and Krosnick point out “voter knowledge regulates the
magnitude ofname-order effects”232. As we have shown, the checklist ballot offers
increased capacities for voters to improve their political knowledge, at Ïeast on the
issues at hand, by dividing the project into separate issues, which makes for more
precise and elaborate debates. following this line of reasoning, the name order
effect may be less present with our type of ballot. Furtherrnore, even if we did
postulate some positional effects, a possible remedy to this problem would be to
rotate ballots, as suggested by Bain and Hecock. They suggest that ballots should
be rotated to give equal opportunity to each candidate to be listed first, since “it is
the only way to prevent the order of candidates’ name from influencing the
outcome of the election”233. While Darcy wams us of increased costs in using
ballot rotation234, in an article dealing specifically with ballot rotation, the same
author suggests a rather economic and less burdensome technique of ballot
In the case ofelections, Jolmston et al., in their study ofthe 198$ Free trade election in Canada,
show that electors identified the conservative party (and its leader, Brian Mulroney) with the
acceptance offree trade, and the liberals and NDP with rejection. Hence, even if party information
vas flot on the ballot itself, it was present and known about anyway. However, this does flot mean,
as we have seen earlier, that voters will automatically follow their preferred party in referendum
choices. $ee Richard Johnston, André Blais, Hetwy E. Brady and Jean Crête, Letting the People
Decide: the Dynamics of u Cunadian Election (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992).
The same resuits have been shown for referenda. Harold Clarke and Allan Kornberg, analysing the
1995 Quebec referendum, shows that party, and leader, identification were crucial in the vote
outcome. For example, they show that the popularity ofJacques Parizeau in voters’ perception
influenced the outcome, as lie was flot very popular with the electorate. “For example, if Parizeau
had been as popular as Lévesque, the probability ofa oui vote among women increases by 13%
and among men by 11%”. See “Choosing Canada? The 1995 Quebec Sovereignty Referendum”,
P5: Potitical Science and Politics 29 (1996), 676-682. However, some don’t agree. Kriesi notes,
for example, that only 6% ofvoters are close to political parties, know its position, and mention
that this information was the most important in affecting their political choice. See Hanspeter
Kriesi, “Le défi de la démocratie directe posé par les transformations de l’espace public”, in Yannis
Papadopoulos, Présent et avenir de la démocratie directe (Genève: Georg, 1994), 3 1-72
232 Miller and Krosnick, “The Impact of Candidate Name Order on Election Outcomes”, 316
233 Bain and Hecock, Ballot Position and Voter’s C’hoice, 90
234 For example, printing and administrative costs will rise sensibly. See R. Darcy, “Position
Effects with Party Column Ballots”, Western Political Quarterty 39 (1986), 648-662
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rotation which he cails the Robson technique235. We thus conclude that, though
positional effects shouki not be completely discounted, they do flot pose that great
arisk.
A second disadvantage involves the problem of conditional preferences. It
is possible that since the issues are presented and voted on separateÏy, the resuit
may be flawed, in the sense that some electors could have voted differently on
certain issues had they known the outcome on other issues. For example, in a list
of items involving different spending items, an elector would choose to allocate
money to the gym class only f money was allocated to the library as well. This
problem is one of nonseparability of preferences: when forelmowledge of the
voting resuit on one proposition affects the voter’s preferred resuit on the other
proposition. This situation has been described by Brams et al. as the multiple
election paradox236. They differentiate between proposition aggregation, where
votes are tallied for each proposition, and combination aggregation, where
propositions are grouped together and voted upon as combinations. Their research
shows that majority choice by proposition aggregation may in fact receive fewer
235 See R. Darcy, “Rotation of Ballots: Minimizing the Number of Rotations”, Electorat Studies 12
(1993), 77-82. It should be mentioned that the state ofAlaska rotates its ballots. In dealing with
ballot rotation, though we advocate its use in the case ofthe checklist ballot, we should be aware of
certain complications that could arise from using dïfferent ballots on the same electorate. For
example, Hamilton and Ladd, smdying North Carolina elections, demonstrate that changes in the
balloting sfrucmre can affect political outcornes at the local level. See James T. Hamilton and
Helen f. Ladd, “Biased Ballot? The Impact of Ballot Structure on North Carolina Elections in
1992”, Public Choice 87 (1996), 259-280. However, they find that the changes in ballot did not
affect the overall outcome.
236 See Steven J Brams, D. Marc Kilgour and William S. Zwicker, “The Paradox of Multiple
Elections”, Social CÏ,oice and Welfare 15 (1998), 211-36; Brams, Kilgour and Zwicker, “Voting
on Referenda”; see also Hannu Nurmi and Tommi Meskanen, “Voting Paradoxes and MCDM”,
Group Decision and Negotiation 9 (2000), 297-3 13; Hannu Nurmi, Voting Paradoxes and How to
Deal With Them (Berlin: Springer, 1999), chap. 7
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votes when voters are aggregated by combination237. They conclude that this is
due to the fact that some voters have nonseparable preferences. The remedy they
propose is that propositions be grouped together and voted on as combinations.
This, they say, would give much more flexibility to voters with non-separable
preferences.
However, such truncations do not seem necessary in our case. First, Brams
et al. do flot give estimates of how many voters have nonseparable preferences;
thus, these electors may represent only a tiny portion of the total electorate.
Second, we advocate the use ofthe checklist ballot as a way for the elector not to
have to vote on a tightly-knitted referendum package, but rather to let her have the
opportunity to express herseif directly on separate issues. Voting by combination
would, it is true, stili permit some flexibility in the package that is presented to the
public; however, it would flot have as much flexibility as our present checklist
proposition.
Furthermore, it should be reminded that the question of conditional
preferences is presented as an information problem: outcomes could be different if
citizens had substantial information about how others would vote before casting
their own vote(s). But information may not be as sparse as assumed in some ofthe
literature. Verba notes that sample surveys, which are regularly done and whose
resuits are posted during and after election campaigns, represent one of the most
237 Brams, Kilgour and Zwicker, The Paradox of Multiple Elections’, 214
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utilized information gathering tools in estimating how others’ in the polity wiiI
vote, and are excellent methods to estimate the state of public opinion.
Polis provide information that did flot previously exist. They aliow adjustment of
campaign strategies to the winds of opinion. [...] Poils give some content to the levei of public
support by dealing with the reactions of the pub1ic to particular poiicies. {...] Surveys provide us
with a relativeiy unbiased view of the public by combining science and representativeness. [...]
Surveys can probe preferences on many issues238.
In addition, as Sudman and Bradbum note, the field of opinion poil
researching lias become more and more mature, and has become increasingiy
accurate239. Thus, even if poils are flot the best guide for iegislators in deciding
issues of poiicy-making, they are real indicators of what people are thinking about,
and in what manner240. finally, as Johnston et al. show, analysing the 1992
Canadian referendum, most electors knew which of the YES or NO options was
leading in the poils, which gives electors further information on how the campaign
is moving along, how diverse groups have managed to mobilize their members
and in what direction241.
Furthermore, as Brady and Sniderman show, citizens “are remarkably
accurate in estimating the issue positions of strategic groups in poiitics?T242. While
the educated strata can accompiish this on the basis ofknowledge ofother groups’
238 Sidney Verba, ‘The Citizen as Respondent: Sample Sun’eys and American Democracy”,
American Political Science Review 90 (1996), 3-4
239 See Seymour Sudman and Norman M. Bradburn, “The Organizationai Growth of Public
Opinion Research in the United states”, Public Opinion Quarterly 51(1987), S67-S78
240 See David L. Paietz, Jonathan Y. Short, Helen Baker, Barbara Cookman Campbeil, Richard J.
Cooper, and Rochelle M. Oeslander, ‘Poils in the Media: Content, Credibility, and Consequences”
Public Opinion Quarterly 44 (1980), 495-5 13.
241 Johnston, Biais, Giddengil and Neviffe, The challenge ofDirect Deinocracy
242 See Henry E. Brady and Paul M. Sniderman, “Attitude Attribution: a Group Basis for Political
Reasornng”, American Political Science Review 79 (1985), 1061
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positions, the major part of the population relies on a likeability heuristic. This
heuristic has two components: 1) a person’s own belief on an issue; 2) the person’s
feelings toward the group whose issue positions lie or she is estimating. Thus, the
heuristic rests on a two-sided “us vs. them” character of politics, which “helps
ensure the accuracy of the attribution to the extent it accentuates the difference
between your side and the other”243. This evidence is also supported by Rouquette:
“Il semble qu’un des axiomes les plus fondamentaux de la logique sociale [...] soit
à peu près le suivant: ‘j’appartiens à un groupe et ce groupe est différent des
autres’. [...] l’appartenance est inséparable de la différentiation conime la mesure
de la proximité de celle de la distance”244. This allows the elector to know about
the positions of the main groups or organizations in society, like unions, big
business or other interest groups. However, we contend, this does flot altow him to
have a precise figure ofhow many electors these groups represent.
Then, since voters do not aiways initially possess ail information about
how others intend to vote, this could lead us to conclude that the problem of
conditional preference is one that should be taken seriously. At the same time,
conditional preferences may not be as common in reality as it is sornetimes
presented, and with the data on opinion polis, and Brady and Sniderman’s
likeability heuristic, in addition to the evidence presented by Johnston et ai., we
may conclude that the probiem of conditional preferences is not that serious in the
case ofthe checkiist ballot.
243 Ibid., 1075
244 Michel-Louis Rouquette, La psychologie politique (Paris: PUF, 1988), 55
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A final disadvantage that should be discussed relates to possible problems
of coherence in the outcome of the checklist ballot. As a vote is taken on different
issues, it may happen that some issues pass the threshold, while other issues do not
pass the threshold, but these issues are linked. For example, electors would pass
one issue on the ballot pertaining to capping the size of classes, while rejecting
another issue on the ballot that would increase school budgets. Thus, the outcome
on one issue would be plagued or contradicted by that on another. This problem is
real, and we cairnot present any magical solutions that would alleviate this
problem. However, one possible solution is for the deliberant assembly to be
diligent about items it presents. Issues on the ballot should be presented clearly,
and the items on the ballot should be chosen and presented with the intent of
minimizing potential contradictions in the outcomes. As we have stated in our
section on ballot construction, bureaucrats and other dites would assist the
assembly to help ensure the legality and coherence of items and their presentation.
Conclusion
We have seen that the checklist ballot offers interesting advantages. First,
the ballot provides increased electoral alternatives, i.e. more choice and multiple
wiimers. This offers the possibility for the electorate to show more nuanced
preferences for individual parts of a project. Second, the ballot offers enhanced
possibilities for improving and strengthening voter competence, as defined by
99
Johnston and Lupia, by allowing for more focused and precise debates, centered
on each issue and its consequences.
We also discussed possible disadvantages of the ballot, but showed that
these disadvantages were flot overwhelming for the checklist ballot. first, the
ballot could be susceptible to positional effects. However, we have shown that a
growing body of research discounts the findings of positional effects on the
grounds of methodological flaws, for example, flot controlling for incumbency
effects. We also discussed possible problems of conditional preferences and
coherence, but showed that information about others’ voting intentions was not SO
sparse, and that coherence could be enhanced and managed through diligent ballot
construction on the part ofthe deliberant assembly.
Conclusion
This thesis has argued that the checklist ballot enables electors to get a
better presentation ofwhat they are voting for, and a clearer picture ofthe possible
outcomes. The basic argument of this thesis is that the checklist ballot is the best
balloting method to ensure that electors can properly express their preferences,
and for referendum outcomes to reafly reflect voters’ opinions. An analytical
framework containing two fundamental assumptions was put forth from which we
worked. First, we tried to find ways to increase the actual participation of citizens
in political processes that affected their lives. Our framework was built around our
contention that an increase in political participation brings about an increase in
political skills and interest. In this sense, we postulated that participation breeds
education. Second, we wanted to promote ways in which choices offered to the
electorate were presented in a manner that would discourage government
manipulation, and would present the choices as they really are.
Our thesis was divided into four chapters. In the first chapter, we defended
direct democracy on the grounds that it was not inherently biased against
minorities,. and that voters were competent to vote directly for legislations.
Furthermore, we showed that it increased govemment responsiveness, and that it
had significant political education functions. In the second chapter, we discussed
ballot construction methods. Having reviewed both methods used in the Jackson
and B.C. referenda, we proposed our own method, the ‘deliberative method’, and
showed that it best fitted our analytical framework. In the third chapter, we
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discussed thresholds. We proposed that a qualified rnajority be set for items to
pass; however, we made the case that this qualified majority should be adjustable
to the decision to be taken, as sorne have more consequences for the polity than
others. Finally, our last chapter presented in a more direct manner the advantages
and disadvantages of the checklist ballot.
We should, at this point, recognize certain aspects of the ballot wé may
have passed over too easily, or that we could not consider more studiously. First,
further attention should have probably been put into the question of coherence.
This we feel is the checklist ballot’s main weakness: by dividing a global
referendum project into different parts, it cannot ensure fool-proof that outcomes
will be coherent. It is our contention that the deliberant assembly should be
particularly aware of the items it presents, and make sure that these items are flot
self-dissipating in any way. If coherence cannot be ensured, this would be a factor
that could make officiaIs less enthusiastic about using the checklist ballot as a tool
of policy making. Thus, more research on this subject could permit us to answer
questions such as: how to ensure this coherence by the deliberative assembly?
What to do in cases of incoherent outcomes?
Related is our contention that division of items will more easily lead to
passage of these. It sould be recognized that the reverse may equally be possible,
since global referenda package sometimes represent a compromise between
different sectors of the polity, between conflicting alternatives. Thus, a global
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constitutional package may also be viewed as an equilibrium whose goal is to
please a majority of people/groups, where tractations take place before the vote,
flot during the campaign. In this sense, one could hypothesize that division of
items may actually weaken the possibility of passage of these separate items.
Thus, this point should be taken into consideration for further research.
Second, we would have liked to present a discussion conceming the
possibilities of the checklist ballot to help resolve certain voting paradoxes,
namely Ostrogorski245 and Anscornbe’s paradoxes246. Both relate to the fact that a
majority of voters may have voted in the minority in a majority of cases. Both
have the same mathematical structure that arises from non-associativity and non
bisymrnetry of the majority rule. Associativity requires that if a majority winrier
between two options (x and y) is confronted to a third option (z), the result should
be the same as when the winner of y and z is confronted to x. Similarly,
bisymmetry requires that when the rnajority winner ofx and y is confronted to the
winner of a and b, the resuits is the same as when the rnajority winner ofx and a is
confronted to the winner of y and b247. There is some evidence that our checklist
ballot could alleviate the occurrences of these paradoxes. In the case of the
245 The paradox lias been put forward in Douglas W. Rae and Hans Daudt, “The Ostrogorski
Paradox: a Peculiarity of Compound Majority Decision’, European Journal 0fPoliticat Research 4
(1976); Hans Daudt and Douglas W. Rae, ‘Social Contracts and the Limits ofMajority Rule” in
Pierre Bimbaum, Jack Lively and Geraint Pany (eds), Democracy, Coitsensus and the Social
Contract (London: Sage publications, 1978), 33 5-57. They named it in honour ofMoisei
Ostrogorski, who was a critic ofmajority principles. See Moisei Ostrogoski, La démocratie et tes
partis politiques (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979 [original publication, 1902])
246 Sec G.E.M. Anscombe, Ethics, Religion, andPolitics (Mimieapolis: University ofMinnesota,
1981).
247 Sec Hannu Nurmi, “Voting Paradoxes and Referenda”, Social Choice and Welfare 15 (1998),
333-50 for a more formai demonstration; also Voting Procedures Under Uncertainty (Berlin:
Springer, 2002)
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Ostrogroski paradox, Lagerspetz writes: “the obvious remedy for the problem is a
referendum democracy. If issues which are separable are voted on separately, the
paradox disappears248. In the case of Anscombe, Cari Wagner finds a way to
soive the problem: instituting a rigid qualified mai ority. In his words:
[W]e find that when prevailing coalitions comprise, on average at least tiuee-fourths of
those voting, the set of voters disagreeing with a rnajority of outcomes cannot comprise a majority.
[...] requiring the assent of a fraction of voters less than three-fourths in order to adopt a proposai
allows for an infinite number of cases where a majority of voters disagree with a majority of
proposais thus adopted249.
However, the evidence was not totally satisfying as it stili left doubts in our
rninds that the checklist could really alleviate these paradoxes. In our
correspondence with Hannu Nurmi and Steven J. Brams, both authors alluded to
their doubts as to the capacity of a balloting method such as the checklist ballot to
alleviate these paradoxes. Thus, we decided to let go of this discussion. However,
we push for more analysis ofthis possibility.
finally, another aspect we wish to discuss is the burdensome character of
our ‘deliberative method’. One could argue that the fact that citizens have so much
control over the proceedings, making harder for the government to secure its
prefened outcomes, there would flot be much incentive for govemments to push
for usage ofsuch a method. In effect, while we wish to promote more utilisation of
direct democracy, what we propose may actually hinder this objective. This is
some fair criticisrn, and shouid be taken into consideration. Our only answer is
that we hope that govemments will have the courage to give the people the tools
248 Erik Lagerspetz, “Paradoxes and Representation”, Electoral Studies 15 (1995), 88
249 Cari Wagner, “Anscombe’s Paradox and the Rule ofThree-Fourths”, Theoiy and Decision 15
(1983), 303; see also “Avoiding Anscombe’s Paradox”, Theoiy andDecision 16(1984), 233-238
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for properly expressing their political demands. The govermnent of British
Columbia will in the next few months be conducting an electoral exercise that
could be described as resembling our ‘deliberative method! in a project concerning
electoral reform. Hopefttlly, this will lead other govemment to gown this alley.
This being said, we wish to encourage our peers to engage in more
research on the subject of the checklist ballot. The ballot seems a better tool for
improving dernocratic efficiency, and making processes more transparent and
fairer. With voter apatliy becoming increasingly apparent, there is a fundamental
need for more research on alternative balloting methods. We cannot but push for
ingenuity and imagination in finding ways that will make democracy work as it
really should: enabling citizens living in community to maximize their welfare, by
giving them proper tools to express and attain their political and social goals.
Lines of research should be pursued, for example, in analysing the circumstances
under which the checklist ballot is best used. As our thesis is an exploratory work,
there is presently insufficient evidence for us to push on this subject. Perhaps the
checklist is best used in spending projects, or in constitutional referenda. Certain
issues, rather than others, are perhaps best presented to the public via a checklist
ballot rather than other balloting methods. We cannot say at the present time. We
hope this thesis lias instilled interest in the ballot, and that others will push to new
ends Imowiedge we have of the checklist ballot. Hopefully, more knowledge will
equal more usage. In light of what we have presented in this thesis, more usage
definitely seems to us a positive thing for strengthening democracy. That is why
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we encourage others to follow in this path, and shed more light on the many
possibilitics of the checklist ballot.
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APPENDIX 1
Whereas the Government of British Columbia is committed
to negotiating workable, affordable treaty settiements that
wiII provide certainty, finality and equality;
Do you agree that the Provincial Government should adopt the
following princîples to guide ïts participation in treaty negotiations?
Yes No
1 Private property should flot be expropriated for treaty sefflements.
The terms and conditions of leases and licences should be Yes No
2 respected; fait compensation for unavoidable distuption of commercial 2
interests shouid be ensured.
Yes No
3 Hunting, fishing and recreational opportunities on Crown land 3
should be ensured for ail British Columbians.
Yes No
4 Parks and protected areas should be maintained for the use and benefit 4
0f ail British Columbians.
Yes No
5 Province-wide standards of resource management and environmental s
protection shou!d continue to apply.
Aboriginal self-government should have the characteristics 0f Yes No
6 local govemment, with powers delegated from Canada and 6
Btitish Columbia.
Treaties should include mechanisms for harmonizing land use planning Yes No
7 between Abotiginal governments and neighbouring 7
local governments.
Yes No
s The existing tax exemptions for Aboriginal people should be 8
phased out. LJ
Mark your choice for each statement by marking a or X in the Yes or No box beside questions I to 8.
